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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN KANSAS
INSURANCE LAW
Robert H. Jerry, II*
The interest of academicians in insurance law has greatly in-
creased during the 1980s. During this period a new one-volume
treatise was published,' and an older treatise was substantially
revised.2 Three new insurance law casebooks appeared on the
market (one of which has already gone to a second edition),' an
older casebook was updated,4 and this author is aware of plans
for the publication of three more. The theory of insurance regu-
lation was explored in an important work,' and the law reviews
are giving increased attention to insurance law issues. This height-
ened interest is long overdue; indeed, practitioners who have long
understood the relevance of insurance law might profess perplexion
that academia took so long to give the field its due. Clearly, the
liability insurance crisis of the 1980s, the related issues of tort
reform, the dispute over the use of gender in insurance rating,
and the implications of AIDS for insurance underwriting have all
focused public attention in varying degrees on insurance law and
regulation. But these highly visible issues are only a small portion
of recent insurance law developments, as anyone involved in the
field knows. Insurance is involved in some way in almost every
transaction or event that occurs; inevitably, then, new questions
and problems continually arise.
Since 1959 the Kansas Law Review has encouraged commentary
on recent developments in Kansas insurance law. 6 This article
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3. E. FISCHER & P. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW (1986); K. YORK & 3.
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continues this tradition, examining developments that have oc-
curred during the last five years.7
I. PROPERTY INSURANCE
A. The Mortgagor-Mortgagee Relationship
Normally the owner of real estate subject to a mortgage is
required by the mortgagee to purchase property insurance for the
mortgagee's benefit. This causes most owners to purchase an
owner-mortgagee insurance policy, which contains a clause desig-
nating the mortgagee as the loss payee and a "standard mortgage
clause." The standard mortgage clause provides that proceeds be
paid to the mortgagee "as interests appear" or words to that
effect, that the mortgagee's coverage will not be invalidated by
any act or neglect of the mortgagor, and that if the insurer pays
proceeds to the mortgagee in circumstances in which the mortga-
gor's coverage is invalid, the insurer will be subrogated to the
mortgagee's rights against the mortgagor.' The Kansas Supreme
Court reaffirmed this understanding of the standard mortgage
clause in Neises v. Solomon State Bank,9 a 1985 decision.
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Liggett,'0 the mortgagee,
through the inadvertence of the insurance agent who sold the
policy to the mortgagor, was not designated as the loss payee on
the insurance policy obtained by the mortgagor. Under the terms
of the mortgage, the mortgagor was required to purchase insurance
for the protection of the mortgagee. Following an earlier Kansas
decision," the court held that the mortgagee, even though not
7. The coverage of this survey begins where the 1984 survey ended: in the middle of
volume 233 of the Kansas Reports and volume 8 of the Kansas Court of Appeals Reports.
See Jerry, Recent Developments in Kansas Insurance Law: A Survey, Some Analysis, and
Some Suggestions, 32 KAN. L. REV. 287 (1984). This Survey will not discuss the tort reform
issues that have a very close nexus with medical malpractice insurance rates and coverages.
See Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663, 740 P.2d 1058 (1987) (holding unconstitutional the
legislation abrogating the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases); Kansas
Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251 (1988) (holding uncon-
stitutional 1986 H. 2661). This survey will also omit Barnes v. Kansas Dep't of Revenue,
238 Kan. 820, 714 P.2d 975, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 911 (1986), in which the court in
a four-to-three decision rejected a constitutional challenge to the provisions of the Kansas
Automobile Injury Reparations Act pertaining to suspension of a license for failure to
maintain insurance.
8. See generally R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 53A.
9. 236 Kan. 767, 696 P.2d 372 (1985).
10. 236 Kan. 120, 689 P.2d 1187 (1984).
11. Robinson v. Breuninger, 152 Kan. 644, 107 P.2d 688 (1940).
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designated as the loss payee, was entitled to the protection required
in the mortgage and provided by the policy and possessed an
equitable lien upon the proceeds of the insurance to the extent of
its interest. 12
A common fact pattern giving rise to disputes among mortgagor,
mortgagee, and insurer involves the alleged or actual arson of the
mortgagor. In Neises the court considered what burden the insurer
must carry to establish that the insured has voided his policy by
his own arson. A few courts in other jurisdictions impose a burden
on the insurer to establish that a fire loss resulted from the
insured's arson; these courts typically require the insurer to prove
the arson by "clear and convincing evidence."" The Neises court
rejected this approach, instead holding that "the insurer's evidence
need only be by a preponderance of the evidence or more probably
true than not."l 4 The court said the insurer's arson defense was
fundamentally a claim that the insured committed an unlawful act
that constituted a simple breach of contract. As such, the insurer's
evidence of the insured's arson "need not be clear and convincing,
exclude any reasonable doubt, preclude any other possibility, or
be the only reasonable explanation for what occurred.""
B. Recovery for Insurer's Breach of Duty to Pay-Poceeds:
Attorney's Fees
Kansas has two statutes relevant to the award of attorney's fees.
Section 40-908 of Kansas Statutes Annotated, which dates to 1893,
states that the court shall allow a plaintiff a reasonable sum as an
attorney's fee for services in any action in which judgment is
rendered against any insurance company on any policy given to
insure property in Kansas against loss by fire, tornado, lightning,
or hail.' 6 Section 40-256 of Kansas Statutes Annotated, adopted
in 1931, provides that whenever an insurer "without just cause or
excuse" fails to pay the full amount of loss and the insured
recovers a judgment against the insurer on that account, the
plaintiff shall be awarded a reasonable sum as an attorney's fee. 7
12. Liggett, 236 Kan. at 126, 689 P.2d at 1192.
13. See Neises, 236 Kan. at 775, 696 P.2d at 378 (citing three jurisdictions).
14. Id. at 776, 696 P.2d at 378.
15. Id.
16. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-908 (1986).
17. Id. § 40-256 (1986). See Friedman v. Alliance Ins. Co., 240 Kan. 229, 239, 729
P.2d 1160, 1167 (1986) (when insurer refused to pay claim in situation in which there was
dearth of other cases and a "good faith question of coverage," awarding attorney fees to
successful plaintiff was unwarranted); Kansas Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Miller, 236 Kan.
811, 820, 696 P.2d 961, 968 (1985) (attorney fees not justified under KAN. STAT. ANN. §
40-256, when insured showed no bad faith on part of the plaintiffs and as there existed a
"valid controversy" in the case).
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If the legislature intended to replace section 40-908 with section
40-256, it failed to do so; section 40-908 was not repealed. Section
40-908 is narrower than section 40-256 in the sense that it only
applies to the specifically enumerated kinds of insurance, but it is
broader than section 40-256 in the sense that it calls for attorney's
fees whenever the insured prevails in the litigation, regardless of
whether the insurer's refusal to pay proceeds was made with "just
cause or excuse." 8
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Liggett,9 the Kansas
Supreme Court held, affirming an earlier holding, 20 that sections
40-908 and 40-256 are not inconsistent, and that section 40-908 is
not repealed by section 40-256. Accordingly, any insured fitting
within the scope of section 40-908 is entitled to attorney's fees,
even when the insurer acts in good faith, with just cause, and with
a reasonable excuse in refusing to pay proceeds.
In Liggett, the mortgagee-bank was not designated as a loss
payee and thus was not an insured under the policy. The court in
Liggett essentially reasoned that the benefits of section 40-908 run
to insureds, not to parties who have equitable liens upon the
proceeds payable to insureds. As such, the mortgagee-bank was
held not entitled to an attorney's fee under section 40-908.21
Whether the mortgagee-bank would have been entitled to attorney's
fees had it been named the loss payee is not clear from the court's
opinion. The court said the "Bank's claim against the insurance
carrier was derivative, at least until the claim of the policyholder
was defeated"; 2 2 this could also be said about a loss payee's claim.2 1
The court noted that the insureds did not leave it to the bank to
pursue the insurer, but instead actively asserted their own rights;24
this could have occurred if the bank were a loss payee. The court
said the bank was not a named insured;25 a bank as loss payee is
not the "named insured" either, although the loss payee can be
considered an "insured" that is identified in the policy. Normally
18. See Thomas v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 233 Kan. 775, 780, 666 P.2d 676,
680 (1983) (attorney fees allowed under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-908 when judgment exceeded
insurer settlement offer).
19. 236 Kan. 120, 127-28, 689 P.2d 1187, 1193-94 (1984).
20. Ferrellgas Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 187 Kan. 530, 358 P.2d 786 (1961).
21. Ligget, 236 Kan. at 127, 689 P.2d at 1193.
22. Id. at 128-29, 689 P.2d at 1194.
23. The coverage for the mortgagee protects the mortgagee's security interest, which
is a lien on the property, and as such can be called "derivative" in nature.
24. Ligget, 236 Kan. at 129, 689 P.2d at 1194.
25. Id. at 129, 689 P.2d at 1194.
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the owner-mortgagee policy is considered two policies in one. 26
Thus, the mortgagee is an insured, and, it would seem, is entitled
to attorney's fees under section 40-908. Liggett, however, does not
decide this question.
Another uncertainty in section 40-256 is whether the statute
allows the recovery of attorney's fees when a liability insurer has
breached the duty to defend. It is settled that when an insurer
unjustifiably refuses to provide a defense to an insured, the insured
who must obtain defense counsel is entitled to recover defense
costs as damages for the insurer's breach of contract. 27 The un-
resolved question is whether the insured can recover attorney's fees
incurred in bringing an action against the insurer for breach of
the duty to defend. Arguably, these attorney's fees are foreseeable,
consequential damages naturally arising out of the insurer's breach:
if the insurer breaches the duty to defend, the insured will have
to hire an attorney not only to defend the underlying suit but also
to bring a suit to recoup those damages. 28 Yet American courts
generally require each party in litigation to bear its own attorney's
fees. This principle suggests that the insured suing the insurer for
breach of its duties should pay for the insured's own attorney.29
The language of section 40-256 seems directed to failures of
insurers to pay claims for proceeds due under policies, not to
losses arising when an insured incurs additional expenses due to
the liability insurer's failure to provide a defense.3 0 This is how
the court read the statute in Harper v. Prudential Insurance Co.
of America," when it stated that attorney's fees shall be allowed
"if it appears from the evidence that the insurance company has
refused without just cause or excuse to pay the claim." 2 To the
26. As stated in Neises v. Solomon State Bank, 236 Kan. 767, 696 P.2d 372 (1985),
the standard mortgage clause "creates a new and independent contract which entitles the
mortgagee to recover under the policy of insurance, notwithstanding the effect of any act
or neglect on the part of the owner or mortgagor of the property." Id. at 777, 696 P.2d
at 379 (citing Fancher v. Carson-Campbell, Inc., 216 Kan. 141, 144, 530 P.2d 1225, 1228
(1975)). Neises also stated that the standard mortgage clause "operates as a distinct and
separate contract between the insurer and the mortgagee." Neises, 236 Kan. at 778, 696
P.2d at 380.
27. See Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 681, 512
P.2d 403 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979).
29. See, e.g., Fuller v. Lloyd, 714 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Heshion Motors
v. Western Int'l Hotels, 600 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Reis v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 69 Ill. App. 3d 777, 387 N.E.2d 700 (1978).
30. See Jerry, supra note 7, at 308-09.
31. 233 Kan. 358, 662 P.2d 1264 (1983).
32. Id. at 372, 662 P.2d at 1274 (emphasis in original).
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same effect is Sloan v. Employers Casualty Insurance Co.," in
which the court stated that "[tihe statute speaks of a company
which has 'refused' to pay. This surely contemplates a demand
[presumably for payment] which has been denied." 3 4
A broader reading of section 40-256 is suggested by a more
recent Kansas case. In Missouri Medical Insurance Co. v. Wong,"
the court approved a trial court's apparent finding that both section
40-256 and the insurer's breach of its obligation to defend entitled
the insured, who was "compelled to employ independent counsel
and [had] incurred attorney fees and expenses in establishing
coverage and plaintiff's duty to defend," to a judgment against
the insurer for all such attorney's fees, expenses, and costs. 6
Although the scope of the holding in Wong is arguable," the
decision provides some support for allowing the insured to recover
as damages the attorney's fees incurred in bringing the action
against the insurer for breach of the duty to defend. Such a result,
however, gives section 40-256 a broader construction than its plain
language seems to allow.
Wong made clear that the benefits of section 40-256 belong only
to insureds and cannot be claimed by third parties such as tort
victims, who have no contractual relationship with the insurer."
33. 214 Kan. 443, 521 P.2d 249 (1974).
34. Id. at 444, 521 P.2d at 251. See also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Medical
Protective Co., 570 F. Supp. 964, 974 (D. Kan. 1983), aff'd, 768 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.
1985).
35. 234 Kan. 811, 676 P.2d 113 (1984).
36. Id. at 822-23, 676 P.2d at 122-23.
37. Paragraph 24 of the trial court's finding stated that § 40-256's provisions "are
applicable to declaratory judgment actions such as this," thereby indicating that § 40-256
was part of the authority for the award of attorney's fees. Wong, 234 Kan. at 822, 676
P.2d at 122. In paragraph 29, however, the trial court stated that "plaintiff had a contractual
duty to provide a defense to its insured, defendant Wong, under the terms of its policy,
and that includes this declaratory judgment action, aside from any right defendant Wong
has to an allowance of fees pursuant to K.S.A. 40-256," thereby suggesting that the
contract, and not necessarily § 40-256, was the basis for the award of fees. See id. at 822,
676 P.2d at 123. If this is what Wong means, the case would be squarely consistent with
Upland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noel, 214 Kan. 145, 519 P.2d 737 (1974). In Noel, the court held
that "[wihere an insurance company denies coverage and the duty to defend under a
homeowner's liability insurance policy and brings a declaratory judgment action against
the insured to determine that issue, the insured is entitled to recover attorney fees and
expenses incurred in defense of the declaratory judgment action if it is determined that
there is coverage and a duty to defend." Id. at 145, 519 P.2d at 738. Noel did not rely
on § 40-256, but instead reasoned that the insurer "is obligated under its policy to reimburse
the insured Noels for all reasonable expenses incurred at the company's request," and the
filing of a declaratory judgment action that the insured was required to defend was deemed
such a "request." Noel, 214 Kan. at 152, 519 P.2d at 743.
38. Wong, 234 Kan. at 825, 676 P.2d at 124.
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This result gives the statute an identical construction in the third-
party insurance setting and the first-party insurance setting: in no
event can noninsureds claim attorney's fees. 9
C. Calculating Actual Cash Value
A limitation on the proceeds payable under a property insurance
policy is that the insured may not recover more than the property's
"actual cash value." Sometimes the policy expresses the actual
cash value limitation along with a reference to depreciation. At
other times the actual cash value limitation stands alone. Except
for the occasional reference to depreciation, most policies do not
define actual cash value, instead leaving it to courts to determine
what the phrase means when the insurer and insured cannot agree
on an appropriate adjustment of the loss."
In Thomas v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,41 the
Kansas Supreme Court determined the meaning of "actual cash
value" in a "dwelling owners policy" covering the insured's resi-
dence at the time a windstorm caused a tree to fall upon and
damage the insured's roof. The insured rejected the insurer's offer
to settle the loss, and the insured filed suit seeking damages of
3165 dollars. 4 2 The jury returned a verdict of 2545 dollars, which
was reduced by the trial court to 2445 dollars to take into account
the policy's 100-dollar deductible. The insurer appealed.
The insurer promised in the policy to pay for a covered loss
"to the extent of the actual cash value of the property at the time
of loss, but not exceeding the amount which it would cost to
repair or replace the property with material of like kind and
quality within a reasonable time after such loss." 43 Thus, the policy
lacked a specific reference to depreciation. The court noted that
under Kansas's valued policy statute, if the house had been com-
pletely destroyed, the policy's coverage (20,000 dollars) would have
been deemed the value of the property without any offset for
depreciation." Because the insured's recovery, for a total loss would
not have been reduced by the property's depreciation, the court
39. See supra text accompanying notes 21-26.
40. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 93[d].
41. 233 Kan. 775, 666 P.2d 676 (1983).
42. Cents are omitted in this summary.
43. Thomas, 233 Kan. at 776, 666 P.2d at 677.
44. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-905(a) (1986) provides that if an improvement on real
property is insured against loss by fire, tornado, windstorm, or lightning, and the property
is "wholly destroyed," the "amount of insurance written in such policy shall be taken




reasoned that a recovery for a partial loss should not be offset by
depreciation. 45 Also, the court considered it important that the
policy lacked a reference to depreciation. The court declined "to
read such a provision into the policy," which did "not appear to
us to be ambiguous."46 Finally, the court noted the insured's
reasonable expectations: "we are of the opinion a reasonable
person in the same predicament as appellee would not expect
depreciation to be considered to reduce and impair his ability to
repair his partially damaged dwelling."41
If the court in Thomas had allowed depreciation to be taken
into account in calculating actual cash value, the proceeds paid to
the insured would not have been sufficient to replace the roof,
and the insured would have been required to contribute additional
money to the replacement. From one perspective, such a result
does not make the insured whole. Yet the insured lost a "used
roof" worth much less than a new roof; taking depreciation into
account means that the insured is compensated in full for the used
roof and is thus made whole. Indeed, if the used roof is replaced
with a new roof without any cost to the insured, the insured
receives a windfall in the form of a free roof for however long
the damaged roof was on the house prior to its destruction.
Insurance is not supposed to provide the insured with a benefit
exceeding net loss.4" The insured who receives a free roof for a
period of years, however, arguably receives such an excess benefit.
The insurer's argument would have had more appeal if the
insured could have replaced the damaged roof with a "used roof"
of like kind and quality at no greater cost than the amount of
proceeds recovered. If, for example, the insured had lost a five-
year-old car, it would be possible to remedy the loss by giving the
insured an equivalent used car. But in circumstances in which the
insured cannot go onto the market and use the proceeds to replace
what was lost, measuring the insured's loss by the replacement
cost (that is, actual cash value without regard to depreciation) is
a closer approximation of the insured's actual loss. In Thomas,
that method of computation happened to coincide with the literal
language of the policy, even if the insurer had not intended to
compute the loss in that manner.
45. Thomas, 233 Kan. at 776, 666 P.2d at 678.
46. Id. at 777, 666 P.2d at 678. In so ruling, the court repudiated the analysis in
Unified School Dist. No. 285 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 244,
627 P.2d 1147 (1981), in which the court defined actual cash value as "cost of repair or
replacement, less applicable depreciation." Id. at 252, 627 P.2d at 1154.
47. Thomas, 233 Kan. at 778, 666 P.2d at 679.
48. See R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 41.
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As a result of Thomas, insurers have changed the policy forms
to make clear that the actual cash value computation requires
taking depreciation into account. This means that an insured who
wishes to be reimbursed for the full replacement cost of property
should be certain to purchase that kind of coverage.
It is worth noting that the court in Thomas limited its holding
to the "facts in this case." 4 9 In Insurance Company of North
America/Aetna Insurance Co. v. City of Coffeyville,so the federal
district court, per Judge O'Connor, refused to apply Thomas
because of different facts. On August 5, 1983, the city's electrical
power plant exploded. The policy covering the loss stated that the
city was covered "to the extent of the actual cash value of the
property at the time of loss, but not exceeding the amount which
it would cost to repair or replace the property with material of
like kind and quality within a reasonable time after such loss."',
The city argued that depreciation should not offset the amount of
recovery, which would mean that the city would recover approxi-
mately 2.6 million dollars for the loss of the power plant instead
of approximately 1.7 million dollars. In interpreting the phrase
"actual cash value" as meaning replacement cost minus depreci-
ation, the court noted several differences between the facts of City
of Coffeyville and Thomas. In City of Coffeyville the policy
offered the insured the option of either actual cash value coverage
or replacement cost coverage. Having declined replacement cost
coverage, the city would not reasonably expect to receive it.2 Also,
the policy had a special endorsement providing the insured with
replacement coverage without deduction for depreciation for losses
less than one thousand dollars, thereby suggesting that depreciation
would be taken into account for larger losses.13 Finally, another
loss was settled by the parties under the same policy by deducting
depreciation from the replacement cost.5 4
II. PERSONAL INSURANCE
A. Health Insurance and Assigned-Risk Plans,"
In 1969 the legislature authorized the Insurance Commissioner
to establish an assigned risk plan for individuals who are unable
49. Thomas, 233 Kan. at 778, 666 P.2d at 679.
50. 630 F. Supp. 166 (D. Kan. 1986).
51. Id. at 169 (quoting Thomas v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 233 Kan. 775,
776, 666 P.2d 676, 677 (1983)).
52. City of Coffeyville, 630 F. Supp. at 169.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 169-70.




"through ordinary methods" to procure accident or sickness in-
surance. Under such a plan, Kansas accident and health insurers
could be required to provide insurance to an "equitable appor-
tionment" of insureds who were unable to procure coverage.16 To
date, no mechanism has developed in Kansas under this statute to
address the needs of those persons unable to obtain health insur-
ance.
In 1986 the Insurance Department proposed legislation that
would have established a pooled risk program in Kansas." This
legislation was not enacted, but the legislature did pass a statute
requiring the Insurance Commissioner to collect data from accident
and health insurers regarding the number of health insurance risks
declined or coverage limitations imposed. In addition, the legisla-
ture instructed the Commissioner to report to the Governor and
legislature, "no later than the commencement of the 1988 regular
session of the Kansas legislature, data obtained . . . along with a
proposed plan . . . ."I According to the statute, the legislature
would review the proposed plan and would decide whether the
plan was needed.
In January 1988 the Insurance Department issued its report,
which concluded that "a need for a risk pool arrangement, however
small it may be, has been identified." 9 The Department recom-
mended establishing "a pooled risk program to be administered
either through a risk assignment mechanism or through a single
plan administered by a selected insurer or administrator."60 The
Department's recommendation was proposed in the 1988 legislature
as Senate Bill 674; this bill was based on model legislation prepared
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
("NAIC").6 1 This bill died in committee, but the Senate did pass
a resolution calling for an interim legislative study on the issue. 62
In December 1988 the Special Committee on Commercial and
Financial Institutions released its report, which recommended "that
no legislation be enacted that would direct or authorize the creation
56. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2112(a) (1986).
57. KANSAS INS. DEP'T, ACCIDENT AND HEALTH RISK POOL REPORT Jan. 1988, at 1.
58. Act approved Apr. 11, 1986, ch. 178, 1986 Kan. Sess. Laws 840, 841 (codified at
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2111(c) (1986)).
59. KANSAS INS. DEP'T, supra note 57, at 6.
60. Id. at 3. According to the Department's report, about 15 states have enacted
legislation creating risk pools; 9 of those pools are currently active, and the other 6 are
expected to become active sometime during 1988. Id. at 5.
61. See Model Health Insurance Pooling Mechanism Act, I MODEL LAws, REGULATIONS
& GUIDLINES (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs) 145-1 (Apr. 1984).
62. See S. Res. 1882, 1988 Kan. Senate Journal 1782.
850 [Vol. 37
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of a health and accident pooling mechanism in Kansas at this
time." 6 The Committee was influenced by the high potential cost
of the program (approximately 4.8 million dollars in the tenth
year of operation) relative to the number of persons projected to
be assisted (approximately 3000 persons). 4 The Committee also
noted an ongoing study of the needs of the medically indigent,
however, and left open the possibility that risk pooling might be
appropriately discussed at a later time in the context of this broader
issue.6 1
B. Limits on the Time Between Accident and Death
Most accidental death benefit endorsements to life insurance
policies (the so-called "double indemnity" provisions) require the
accidental death to result within a specified number of days, usually
90 or 120, after the injury causing the death. These clauses
essentially provide a contractual limitations period after the expi-
ration of which the insurer is certain that the beneficiaries will not
claim that the death was accidental. Part of any insurer's concern
is that when a person with severe injuries survives for a long
period after an accident, the probabilities increase that the ultimate
death will result from a nonaccidental cause, which should not
entitle the beneficiary to double indemnity benefits. In such cir-
cumstances, the limitations clause minimizes the uncertainty re-
garding what caused the insured's death.
In recent years, however, medical advances have made it possible
to prolong life for extended periods of time, thereby increasing
the likelihood that someone injured in an accident will survive the
limitations period before succumbing to an injury. This could
create a perverse incentive for the insured or a beneficiary to refuse
or withhold life-lengthening treatment to enhance the chances that
the presumably inevitable death will occur within the ninety-day
period. This situation has led to the argument in several cases that
the limitation periods violate public policy and are therefore void.
Some courts have accepted this argument, whereas others have
enforced the limitations clauses as written. 6
63. RE: Proposal No. 11-Funding an Accident and Health Assigned Risk Pool, in
REPORT ON KANSAS LEGISLATIVE INTERIM STUDIES TO THE 1989 LEGISLATURE at 117, 127
(1988).
64. The fiscal impact of the Insurance Department's proposal was evaluated in a
private study commissioned by the Department. See id. at 125.
65. Id. at 126-27.
66. See generally R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 64[c].
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The Kansas Supreme Court considered the validity of these
clauses in Hawes v. Kansas Farm Bureau.6 1 In December 1980 the
insured sustained a deep cut on his hand that healed slowly.
Concurrently, he spilled on his hand an antibiotic used to treat
his cattle for shipping fever. In mid-March 1981 he became ill and
was diagnosed as having aplastic anemia, which can be caused
when a substance in the antibiotic is introduced into the human
body. He died of the anemia on September 4, 1981. On appeal,
it was undisputed that the insured acquired the anemia through
accidental means-the spilling of the antibiotic on his cut hand no
later than February 1981.
The deceased was the insured on two life insurance policies,
each of which had double indemnity endorsements providing ben-
efits if the insured died as a result of accidental bodily injury
"within ninety days from the date of such injury." 6 The plaintiff,
the insured's beneficiary, argued that the ninety-day requirements
were invalid and unenforceable. First, the plaintiff argued that the
clauses were unconscionable, but the court held that the doctrine
of unconscionability was inapplicable to the limitations clause.6 9
The plaintiff's second principal argument was that the limitations
violated the public policy of Kansas. The plaintiff's basic point
was that a person injured in an accident might base his decision
on whether to seek life-sustaining procedures on whether his pol-
icies have limitations clauses. The court rejected this argument,
observing that it could be used to invalidate a host of reasonable
exclusions and limitations in life and health insurance policies. 70
The court then quoted at length from an Illinois decision, Kirk v.
Financial Security Life Insurance Co. ,7 in which the court, after
surveying both sides of the issue in detail, held that the limitations
clause did not offend that state's public policy. The court took
special note of Kirk's point that such limitations have been used
for many years in life insurance policies, and any decision declaring
the clauses invalid should be made, if at all, by the legislature or
the Insurance Commissioner.7 2
67. 238 Kan. 404, 710 P.2d 1312 (1985).
68. Id. at 405, 710 P.2d at 1314 (emphasis omitted).
69. Id. at 406, 710 P.2d at 1315. The court quoted at length from Willie v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976), and stated in a conclusory paragraph
that its research revealed no case in which a limitations clause was struck down as
unconscionable and that the doctrine was inapplicable.
70. The court referred to exclusions and limitations of covered services contained in
medical and health care insurance policies and Medicare. Hawes, 238 Kan. at 408, 710
P.2d at 1316.
71. 75 Ill. 2d 367, 389 N.E.2d 144 (1978).
72. Hawes, 238 Kan. at 413, 710 P.2d at 1320.
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The court in Kirk was correct when it observed that no matter
which limitations period is chosen, some people will succumb to
their injuries one day before the end of the limitations period, and
others will succumb one day after the period. Some degree of
arbitrariness is unavoidable. Thus, the issue is not so much the
length of the clauses, but whether insurers should be allowed to
insert the clauses in accidental death benefit policies at all. Some
of the arguments attacking the clauses are strong, but eliminating
the clauses would undoubtedly cause the issue "what caused the
insured's death" to arise in a greater number of cases. This would
lead to additional uncertainty and increased costs; the Kansas
Supreme Court was unwilling to approve a doctrine that would
entail these consequences.
C. The AIDS Crisis and Insurance Underwriting
Federal projections state that by the end of 1991, the total
number of AIDS cases in the United States will reach 270,000,
with 179,000 deaths, unless better treatments are found. In 1991
alone, approximately 54,000 Americans are expected to die as a
result of AIDS. Perhaps as many as one and a half million
Americans are infected with the AIDS virus, and estimates of the
percentage of infected individuals who will progress to AIDS are
as high as one hundred percent.73 The potential impact of this
crisis on the life and health insurance industry is profound.7 4
Because having the AIDS virus is a risk factor that correlates
very strongly with reduced longevity and increased usage of health
care services, life and health insurers have a strong incentive not
only to test for the virus, but also to use other underwriting
guidelines that identify individuals who are in groups in which the
virus is more prevalent. On the other hand, many oppose testing
for the virus (as well as insurer access to the results of prior tests)
on the ground that confidentiality of the test results is difficult to
maintain, and applicants whose results are disseminated, even
inadvertently, to third parties can suffer greatly on this account.
In September 1987 the Kansas Insurance Commissioner issued a
temporary regulation establishing standards for use in underwriting
life, accident, and health insurance risks when AIDS is a consid-
73. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1987, at Al, col. 1; The AIDS Crisis: What it Means for
the Insurance Industry, INS. LITIGATION REP. 282, 282 (1987).
74. See generally Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?
100 HARv. L. REv. 1782 (1987); Clifford & luculano, Aids and Insurance: The Rationale
for Aids-Related Testing, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1806 (1987); Pascal, Statutory Restrictions
on Life Insurance Underwriting of Aids Risk, 54 DEF. CouNs. J. 319 (1987).
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eration.7 1 The temporary regulation, Kansas Administrative Regu-
lation 40-1-36, does not prohibit testing for the AIDS virus. When
an applicant is requested to take a test, however, the insurer must
obtain "written informed consent" from the applicant, must pro-
vide the applicant with "printed material prior to testing containing
factual information describing AIDS" and informing the person
what steps should be taken if the test results are positive, and
must administer a second, more accurate test to substantiate an
initial positive test result.76 Insurers are allowed to ask diagnostic
questions on applications, but insurers are instructed to frame such
questions so as not to elicit information on "lifestyle, sexual
orientation or other inferential information."" In addition, insur-
ers are instructed that adverse underwriting decisions are to be
based on sound actuarial principles.
III. LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. Multiple Versus Single Occurrences
In liability insurance, it is sometimes difficult to determine
whether there has been one occurrence or multiple occurrences.
The majority of courts follow "cause analysis"; the number of
occurrences depends on the number of causes. If there is one
cause, such as one loss of control of a vehicle or one release of a
product into the marketplace, there is one occurrence. A minority
of courts follow "effect analysis"; the number of occurrences is
viewed from the victim's viewpoint, and each injury is viewed as
a separate occurrence. Thus, if an out-of-control vehicle strikes
two vehicles in succession, two occurrences have happened; when
a product is released into the marketplace and causes injury, the
number of occurrences will depend on the number of people
injured.7 1
In North River Insurance Co. v. Huff,79 the federal district court
considered whether several different loan swap transactions con-
75. The Kansas regulation was influenced by, but goes considerably beyond, a model
regulation proposed by the NAIC in late 1986 titled Medical/Lifestyle Questions and
Underwriting Guidelines, I MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs) 162-1 (July 1986). The essence of the NAIC's proposed regulation was a
prohibition on use of sexual orientation in the underwriting process or in determining
insurability.
76. KAN. ADMIN. REGs. 40-1-36 (temporary regulation effective Sept. 17, 1987).
77. Id.
78. See R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 65[c].
79. 628 F. Supp. 1129 (D. Kan. 1985).
[Vol. 37854
SURVEY: INSURANCE LAw
stituted separate occurrences under a policy that covered the lia-
bility of a savings association's directors, officers, and employees.
Each transaction involved the same method of financing the loan,
and each was part of one loan-swap program. The court did not
agree with the insurer, however, that there had been only one
occurrence. Instead, the court reasoned that each loan swap in-
volved a separate transaction: the transactions occurred at different
times, involved different borrowers, were for different purposes,
had different collateral, and did not involve interrelated loans.
Also, the court noted that the damage was caused not by the
program but by the insured's alleged negligence in making or
approving unprofitable loans. As a result, the court concluded that
each loan constituted a separate occurrence under the policy.80
B. Hazardous Wastes and Liability Insurance Coverage
Hazardous and toxic substances are causing increasingly difficult
pollution problems in increasingly diverse settings. The derailed
train or overturned truck carrying chemicals has been a risk for
years. In the 1980s new problems are emerging. Our nation is
discovering that storage tanks buried many years ago are now
deteriorating and leaking their contents into the adjacent ground-
water. For decades businesses put their chemical wastes into barrels
and dumped them, or hired a carrier who then dumped them, at
landfills or other sites where no mechanisms existed to confine the
chemicals once the barrels began to deteriorate. Our nation now
must clean these sites; the price tag for this effort will be enormous.
Predictably, those who operate, own, or use toxic waste sites are
now being asked to pay for the damages caused by these sites and
for the cleanup costs. In many of these situations the operators,
owners, and users ask their liability insurers to pick up the tab.
The commercial liability insurance policy in use from the mid-
1960s until the mid-1980s covered an "occurrence," which was
defined as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions, which results during the policy period, in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured." 8 ' Beginning in 1973, some occurrences
were excluded from coverage under a "pollution exclusion": if the
occurrence was of a kind identified in the pollution exclusion, no
coverage would exist. Even if the event fell within the exclusion,
80. Id. at 1133-34. In another issue in the case, the insurer was found to have waived
a fraud defense by failing to mention it in its reservation of rights letter. Id. at 1134.
81. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 65[d], at 337.
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however, coverage would exist if the event fell within an exception
to the exclusion. If the discharge or other release of pollutants
was "sudden and accidental," the exclusion would be inapplicable
by virtue of the exception, and the occurrence would be covered.
In short, coverage existed under the standard commercial liability
form used widely from 1973 until recently if an "occurrence"
occurred and the pollution exclusion was not applicable. If the
pollution exclusion was applicable, no coverage existed unless the
event fell within the exception to exclusion. Needless to say, this
policy, which is difficult to describe and even harder to understand,
has resulted in an enormous amount of litigation.8 2 Results reached
by the courts in the many cases are diverse and frequently irrec-
oncilable.
In a recent Kansas case, American Motorists Insurance Co. v.
General Host Corp. ("AMICO"),3 a federal district court consid-
ered the scope of coverage for pollution damage under the standard
commercial liability form. Neighboring landowners sued the op-
erator of a salt company, claiming that careless operation of the
salt plant resulted in tons of salt brine polluting the environment,
thereby causing the aquifer under their land to become unfit for
irrigation purposes. In one of these actions, plaintiffs obtained a
judgment for 3.06 million dollars in actual damages and 10 million
dollars in punitive damages. The parent company of the operator
purchased a liability policy for annual policy periods running from
November 1, 1981, to November 1, 1984. A fourth one-year policy
was terminated on June 15, 1985. The insurer argued that coverage
for the claimed damages was not available under the policies, and
the federal district court, per Judge Theis, agreed.
Judge Theis examined the language of the pollution exclusion,
which many courts have found ambiguous. Judge Theis, however,
agreed with courts that have found the exclusion to be clear: "The
meaning of the words 'sudden' and 'accidental' are not so obscure
as to make the clause containing them a nullity. . . . The language
is clear and plain, something only a lawyer's ingenuity could make
ambiguous. "" The salt pollution in question did occur over a long
period of time (fifty to seventy-five years), and Judge Theis was
unable to fit that event within the scope of the exception for
82. For further discussion see id. § 65[e]; R. Jerry, Hazardous Wastes and Liability
Insurance, in UNIv. OF KANSAS DEP'T OF CONTINUINo EDUc., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE
LAW OF HAzARDous WASTE MANAGEMENT (1988).
83. 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987).
84. Id. at 1428, 1429.
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"sudden" events." Furthermore, Judge Theis found no "occur-
rence" in the facts of the case:
Without discussing whether defendants intended to pollute the environ-
ment, it cannot be gainsaid that such a result should have been antici-
pated and expected. . . . Without "damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured" no "occurrence" can be found to
exist; and without an occurrence no coverage is extant.86
AMICO involved particularly extreme facts. In many cases, the
disputed event occurs during a much shorter period of time. In
AMICO, as the court noted, the pollution at issue was the cu-
mulative effect of an industrial process that had been ongoing for
about seventy-five years, and had been known by the insured to
be a potential hazard for about fifty years. Because of those
circumstances, Judge Theis is probably correct that most courts
reaching pro-insured results in other fact situations would have
agreed with his pro-insurer result in AMICO.1 7
Interestingly, Judge Theis's opinion did not bring the litigation
to an end. In recent months attorneys for insureds in hazardous
waste litigation have focused on statements made by the insurance
industry at the time the pollution exclusion was being reviewed by
state insurance regulators for inclusion in the commercial general
liability policy. In these statements industry representatives asserted
that the proposed pollution exclusion did not substantially alter
the coverage provided by the standard liability policy. Insureds
now argue that, by the insurance industry's own admission, the
pollution exclusion did not significantly narrow coverage, contrary
to what many courts have concluded in pro-insurer decisions
today."8
Relying on "new evidence," specifically, the recently discovered
representations concerning the pollution exclusion made on behalf
of the insurance industry to state regulators at the time the
pollution exclusion was introduced, the insureds moved to vacate
the judgment in AMICO under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e). Judge Theis did not discuss the "new evidence" in detail,
and he nevertheless concluded that the evidence supported, rather
than contradicted, his prior conclusions." It is difficult to under-
85. Id. at 1428-29.
86. Id. at 1430.
87. See id. at 1431.
88. See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1987);
Price, Evidence Supporting Policyholders in Insurance Coverage Disputes, 3 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T. 17 (Spring 1988).




stand, however, how the industry's representations in the early
1970s that the pollution exclusion merely clarified existing coverage
are consistent with a conclusion that the exclusion restricted cov-
erage. Regardless, the "new evidence" only pertained to the pol-
lution exclusion, and Judge Theis had an independent ground for
his decision that had nothing to do with the exclusion: there was
no occurrence, and therefore no coverage."
C. The Duties of the Tortfeasor's Insurer to the Victim's
Secured Party
In first-party insurance when multiple parties have an interest
in the insured property (e.g., mortgagor-mortgagee, vendor-vendee,
or bailor-bailee), the questions of how much and who the insurer
pays arise frequently and often present great difficulty. 91 In Schol-
field Brothers, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,92 the Kansas Supreme Court considered a similar issue in the
third-party setting. Parrish, the insured, while negligently operating
her own vehicle, demolished an automobile owned and operated
by Clafer. The Clafer vehicle, which was uninsured, was subject
to a lien held by General Motors Acceptance Corporation
("GMAC").
Clafer was, of course, required by her contract with GMAC to
keep first-party insurance in force on the vehicle, but she had
allowed her insurance to lapse. Pursuant to its contract with Clafer,
GMAC was entitled to acquire insurance to protect its own interest,
but it had not done so. Had first-party insurance been in force
on the vehicle, the insurer would have paid for the loss to the
respective interests of Clafer and GMAC and then could have
asserted subrogation rights against the tortfeasor, Parrish. This
ultimately would have caused the loss to fall on Parrish's insurer.
Indeed, even if GMAC were not named as a secured party on the
title, GMAC would have had an equitable lien on the proceeds of
the insurance up to the amount of the mortgage debt.93
Unfortunately, however, no first-party insurance was in force.
Parrish's liability insurer, State Farm, paid Clafer 3681 dollars for
the "total loss" of her vehicle and received assignment of the
vehicle and title from Clafer. The title showed GMAC as a secured
90. Id. at 133.
91. R. JERRY, supra note 1, §§ 53-53G.
92. 242 Kan. 848, 752 P.2d 661 (1988).
93. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Liggett, 236 Kan. 120, 126, 689 P.2d 1187,
1192 (1984) (involving real estate); Robinson v. Breuninger, 152 Kan. 644, 648, 107 P.2d
688, 691 (1940) (involving real estate).
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party. GMAC refused to assign its interest in the vehicle to State
Farm because it had not been paid the debt owed by Clafer. State
Farm then returned title to GMAC, which essentially amounted to
an abandonment by State Farm of any interest in the vehicle.
After the settlement, Clafer stopped making payments to GMAC.
GMAC then exercised its recourse rights and assigned the contract
back to the car dealer, Scholfield Brothers, which made Scholfield
the owner of the security interest. Clafer later filed for bankruptcy,
listing a debt to Scholfield of 3642 dollars. Of course, had Clafer
continued to make payments to GMAC (or Scholfield), no party
would have been unjustly enriched or unfairly deprived. Unfor-
tunately, however, Clafer obtained the insurance proceeds and then
became insolvent, with Scholfield being one of her creditors. If
Clafer had possessed first-party insurance, and if the first-party
insurer had agreed with State Farm's calculation of the loss, the
first-party insurer would have paid 3642 dollars in proceeds to
GMAC and 39 dollars to Clafer, thereby making both parties
whole. State Farm, however, as Parrish's liability insurer, had
paid Clafer for the loss, which resulted in a windfall to the soon-
to-be-insolvent Clafer and a loss to Scholfield, as the successor to
GMAC.
Having suffered a loss, Scholfield sought to hold State Farm
responsible under the theory that State Farm knew of GMAC's
security interest, and that when State Farm settled with Clafer,
State Farm destroyed GMAC's secured interest, thereby committing
the tort of conversion. The essence of Scholfield's argument was
that the liability insurer had a duty to make sure that proceeds
payable because of its own insured's negligence are paid in a way
that reimburses all who hold partial interests in property damaged
by the insured. The court rejected this argument, instead reasoning
that the debtor, having a right to possession, has a right to receive
the full amount of damages, but must hold the proceeds in trust
for the secured party in an amount equal to the debt owed the
secured party. This means that the tortfeasor has no duty to join
the secured party in a lawsuit brought by the tortfeasor, even if
the tortfeasor has notice of the security interest. 94
After Scholfield Brothers, secured creditors cannot assume that
a liability insurer for the party causing damage to the secured
party will pay proceeds to debtor and creditor, as their interests
may appear. This is true even if the liability insurer has actual
notice of the security interest. Of course, with the first-party
insurer, the creditor can insist that a policy be taken out for the
94. Scholfield Bros., 242 Kan. at 851-53, 752 P.2d at 663-65.
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benefit of both creditor and debtor, and the insurance industry
today willingly cooperates with the creditor's wishes by inserting
the standard mortgage clause in first-party insurance policies. In
contrast, in the liability insurance setting, the creditor is not in
privity with the insurer. After Scholfield Brothers, it would be-
hoove a creditor to require in its contract with the debtor that the
debtor assign all rights to insurance proceeds recovered as reim-
bursement for damage to the property that serves as security for
the debt to the creditor, and that the creditor collect first out of
these proceeds for the amount of the debt.
D. The Duty to Defend and Conflicts of Interest
One of the duties that the insurer owes the insured under a
policy of liability insurance is to provide a defense to any claim
against the insured falling within the coverage, even if the claim
is groundless, false, or fraudulent.95 As summarized in Patrons
Mutual Insurance Association v. Harmon," the insurer owes no
duty to defend the insured when the claims made against the
insured fall entirely outside the coverage. The pleadings themselves,
however, are not dispositive. The insurer must consider any facts
brought to its attention or facts that it could reasonably discover
in determining whether there is a duty to defend. If these additional
facts give rise to potential liability under the policy, a duty to
defend exists. 9 7
The insurer will ordinarily provide an attorney to the insured to
represent the insured's interests whenever a claim within coverage
is made against the insured. The attorney selected by the insurer
is obligated, obviously, to represent zealously the insured's inter-
ests. Nevertheless, the attorney is retained and compensated by the
insurer, creating the potential for the insurer inadequately repre-
senting the insured's interests should the insured's and insurer's
interests conflict.98
One situation in which a conflict between insurer and insured
can develop is when a plaintiff's claim does not clearly indicate
whether the insured who caused an injury to the plaintiff acted
intentionally or negligently. Both the insurer and the insured benefit
from arguing that no tort occurred at all. Assuming some tort
occurred, however, the insured will want to argue that the tort
was negligently inflicted and therefore covered, whereas the insurer
95. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 111, at 561.
96. 240 Kan. 707, 732 P.2d 741 (1987).
97. Id. at 709-10, 732 P.2d at 744.
98. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 114.
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may want to argue that the tort was intentionally inflicted and
therefore was not covered. In such a situation, the insurer's and
insured's interests clearly conflict.99
Patrons Mutual Insurance Association v. Harmon'"0 presented
this sort of conflict. The insured's son sued the insured for damages
arising out of the insured's allegedly negligent killing of the in-
sured's wife (and son's mother). The insurer contended that the
killing was intentional, thereby disqualifying the insured from
coverage. The court referred to the earlier case of Bell v. Tilton, 0'
in which it held that an insurer's mere retention of an attorney to
represent an insured under a reservation of rights does not collat-
erally estop the insurer from challenging fact findings relevant to
coverage in the underlying action. Bell presented a similar conflict
of interest; the insurer had hired independent counsel to defend
the insured in the civil action and had notified the insured that it
was reserving all rights under the policy. The court in Harmon
approved this procedure: "This procedure protects both the in-
sured's and the insurer's interests and rights and eliminates the
necessity of multiple suits to determine the same issues. We believe
this is the proper procedure to protect the rights of both parties
under their contract."l 0 2
In Harmon, the insured, Ron Harmon, held a gun that fired.
The bullet struck his wife Karen in the head, killing her. A jury
found Harmon guilty of voluntary manslaughter. While the crim-
inal trial was pending, the insured's son commenced a wrongful
death action against his father, claiming that he negligently shot
and killed the plaintiff's mother. Patrons, the insurer, refused to
defend on the ground that no coverage existed under the hom-
eowner's policy. Patrons filed a declaratory judgment action to
determine if liability coverage existed under the policy. Before a
hearing on Patron's motion for summary judgment was held, the
trial judge in the underlying action found that, as a matter of law,
Harmon had negligently shot and killed his wife. In the declaratory
judgment action Harmon argued that the finding in the underlying
action was binding on Patrons in the declaratory judgment action
under the mutuality rule of collateral estoppel, 03 and the court
agreed:
99. See id. § 115, at 617-18.
100. 240 Kan. 707, 732 P.2d 741 (1987).
101. 234 Kan. 461, 674 P.2d 468 (1983).
102. Harmon, 240 Kan. at 712, 732 P.2d at 745.
103. The court articulated a three-part test for mutuality in McDermott v. Kansas Pub.
Serv. Co., 238 Kan. 462, 712 P.2d 1199 (1986). The third element of the test is that the




Because Patrons was in privity with a party, Ron Harmon, in the
wrongful death action, it was bound by that judgment. An exception
to the rule would allow Patrons, the insurer, to refuse to defend its
insured in the original action and, if the insured lost, would allow the
insurer to relitigate the same issue against its insured in a subsequent
action. We are not inclined to create a special exception to the mutuality
requirement of collateral estoppel for insurance companies.'"
This reasoning is problematic. Although Harmon was Patrons'
insured and it is correct to say that Patrons was "in privity" with
Harmon, Patrons could not have represented Harmon in the
wrongful death action because its interests were adverse to Har-
mon's.10 When interests are adverse, regardless of whether privity
is present, the nonparticipating party should not be bound to a
fact finding in the action going to a final judgment. As the court
itself acknowledged, numerous courts have recognized in this sit-
uation that the insurer should not be estopped from relitigating
the issue of intent.1o Without refuting this criticism specifically,
however, the court simply stated that the independent counsel
approach followed in Bell was preferable. Although this may be
true,107 it is not responsive to Patrons' contention that it should
not be bound to fact findings in the underlying action because its
interests were adverse to those of the insured.
Nevertheless, the court on an earlier occasion had warned that
ordinarily a declaratory judgment action should not be used to
resolve coverage when a question of fact is the main issue or when
the purpose of the action is to try the fact as a determinative
issue.1os This warning is also predicated on a questionable view of
collateral estoppel, but as long as the court adheres to this view,
insurers should follow the approach recommended in Harmon:
when the insured's and insurer's interests conflict, appoint inde-
pendent counsel for the insured, and provide a full defense under
a reservation of rights. This should save the coverage issue for
possible later litigation and enable the insurer to avoid being
estopped to litigate a fact issue determinative of coverage.
E. The Intentional Act Exclusion
That liability insurers have a legitimate interest in excluding
coverage for injury or damage intentionally caused by the insured
104. Harmon, 240 Kan. at 711, 732 P.2d at 744-45.
105. The court recognized this later in the opinion. See id. at 712, 732 P.2d at 745.
106. See id. (citing cases).
107. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 114[c][5].
108. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 216 Kan. 5, 8-9, 531
P.2d 9, 12-13 (1975).
862 [Vol. 37
SURVEY: INSURANCE LAw
is not seriously questioned. The premiums charged for liability
insurance assume that fortuitous loss is covered; if the insured
controls the risk, the ability of the insurer to calculate fair rates
is frustrated. Even more obvious is the public policy against
indemnifying people for loss caused by their willful wrongdoing.'"
Thus, the typical liability insurance policy excludes injury or dam-
age that is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the
insured."10 This phrase has been interpreted at least three different
ways in decisions of courts around the nation."'
The Kansas Supreme Court faced this issue in Bell v. Tilton,"l2
in which the insured, an eleven-year-old boy, shot a friend in the
eye with a B gun while playing a "game" they had devised. It
was undisputed that the insured did not intend to inflict the severe
injury on his friend's eye that resulted, but there was evidence
that he intended to strike one of the boys at which he was shooting
and to cause a sting. The trial court concluded that the insured
should have expected an injury to result from firing a BB gun
toward his friend's face."' The Supreme Court agreed, stating:
[It was not necessary for the [insurer] to show [the insured] specifically
intended to strike Christopher Bell in the eye with a BB pellet in order
to deny liability. Rather, if from the acts, circumstances, and inferences
of the case, it appeared [the insured] had the. desire to cause the
consequences of his acts or he believed the consequences were substan-
tially certain to result, his conduct was intentional and the policy
exclusion was operative." 4
Applying this test, the court concluded that substantial, competent
evidence supported the finding that the insured had acted inten-
tionally in shooting his friend.
It is, of course, arguable whether the insured's conduct in Bell
met the court's own test. As the court recognized, the insured did
not intend to cause the severe injury that resulted. Moreover, it is
questionable whether any eleven-year-old boy playing with a BB
gun in the unsafe manner involved in Bell believes that severe
consequences are substantially certain to result, although it can be
109. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 63B.
110. Id. at 305.
ill. Id. § 63B[b], at 306. Under one approach, if the intentional act results in injuries
or damage that are a natural and probable result of the act, the loss has been caused
intentionally. The majority approach requires that the insured intend both the act and to
cause some kind of injury or damage. A third approach requires that the insured have had
the specific intent not only to injure but also to cause the particular type of injury suffered.
112. 234 Kan. 461, 674 P.2d 468 (1983).
113. Id. at 469, 674 P.2d at 475.
114. Id. at 472, 674 P.2d at 477.
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said that boys should know (and probably have been told, although
they probably do not believe) that severe consequences can result
from such action. Nevertheless, the court clearly repudiated a rule
that would require the insurer to show that the insured possessed
specific intent not only to act, but also to cause the particular
kind of injury suffered. The court's own extensive analysis before
stating a rule suggests that the court meant to enforce the exclusion
whenever the insurer shows that the insured intended both to act
and to cause some kind of injury, even though the precise kind
of injury resulting is different in character and severity than the
kind of injury intended. Intent to injure can, of course, be inferred
from the nature of the act and the foreseeability of harm flowing
naturally from that act. Consciously firing a BB gun at someone's
face easily meets this alternative test, and this is the test that the
court probably meant to articulate in Bell."'
F. Risk Retention Groups"'6
In the late 1970s, problems with the availability of product
liability insurance caused Congress to consider establishing a fed-
erally regulated insurance program for product liability or com-
pleted operations risks. In 1981 Congress finally enacted the Product
Liability Risk Retention Act,"'7 which permitted businesses to self-
insure through insurance cooperatives called "risk retention groups"
and to purchase insurance on a group basis at more favorable
rates. Congress contemplated that one licensing state would regu-
late the risk retention or purchasing group and that restrictions
would be placed on the authority of nonlicensing states to regulate
the group.
In October 1986 Congress amended the Act to allow the creation
of risk retention groups for many other kinds of liability insur-
ance."' It was hoped that this legislation would increase the
availability of liability insurance, and that the availability of this
alternative would cause insurers to make their products more
affordable. Under the Act as amended in 1986, a risk retention
group is a corporation or other limited liability association formed
for the primary purpose of assuming and spreading all, or a
115. See R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 63B[b], at 308-09.
116. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of David Roberts in
preparing this section.
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3904 (1982), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906 (Supp. 1988).
118. Risk Retention Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-563, 100 Stat. 3170 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906 (Supp. 1988)).
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portion of, the liability exposure of its members." 9 The group
must be licensed or chartered and authorized to do business as a
liability insurer under the laws of one state; 20 this distinguishes
the group from the typical liability insurer, which must be licensed
in every state where it does business. The Act contains separate
and distinct provisions for purchasing groups. The definition of a
purchasing group is much less restrictive; a trade association could
ordinarily fit within the statutory definition of a purchasing group. '2
In 1983 the NAIC approved its Model Risk Retention Act.1 2
This model act, which was amended in 1987 in light of the 1986
federal legislation, was designed to regulate the formation and
operation of risk retention groups and purchasing groups to the
fullest extent permitted by federal law. As of October 1988 thirty-
three states had adopted the revised model act, one state had
adopted the older version, and legislation was pending in one more
state.m
During the 1986 session the Kansas legislature enacted a statute
authorizing the formation of product liability risk retention groups
and specifying certain standards for their regulation.1 24 In the 1987
session the legislature enacted, with only a few departures, the
NAIC's revised model act, which closely adheres to the authority
granted by the 1986 federal legislation.1 25 As of August 1988, 202
purchasing groups had filed an intention to form in Kansas under
the Federal Risk Retention Act of 1986; 39 of those groups had
been issued certificates of compliance.1 26 As of the same date forty-
three risk retention groups had filed with the Kansas Insurance
Department, and thirteen of those, all involving health care prov-
iders or medical personnel, had been authorized to operate within
the state. 127
119. 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(4) (Supp. 1988).
120. An exception exists for groups chartered as an offshore risk retention group under
the 1981 statute. Id. § 3901(a)(4)(C)(ii).
121. Id. § 3901(a)(5)(A).
122. Model Risk Retention Act, II MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, & GUIDELINES (Nat'1
Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs) 705-1 (Jan. 1987).
123. Id. at 705-17 to 705-20 (Oct. 1988).
124. Act approved Apr. 14, 1986, ch. 166, 1986 Kan. Sess. Laws 815 (amended 1987).
125. Act approved Apr. 17, 1987, ch. 172, 1987 Kan. Sess. Laws 837.
126. KANSAS INs. DEP'T, NEWSLETTER, Aug. 1988, at 4.
127. Id. For further information on risk retention groups generally, see Myers, Regu-
latory Authority Under the Risk Retention Act, 6 J. INs. REG. 72 (1987); Ling, Development
of Association Insurance Captives: Application of the Federal Risk Retention Act to
Developed and Developing Countries, 5 J. INs. REG. 384 (1987); Business Insurance, Oct.
31, 1988, at 1; Bader, Risk Retention Groups: A Risk-Management Alternative, J. OF




A. Duty to Procure Insurance
In a variety of circumstances agents and brokers have been held
liable under both contract and tort theories for failing to procure
insurance for the benefit of an individual or some other entity.1 28
A similar kind of claim arises when an individual alleges that
someone unaffiliated with the insurance industry who is in a
fiduciary or contractual relationship with that party breached an
obligation to procure insurance for that party's benefit.
Clearly, if A enters into a contract with B to purchase an
insurance contract for the benefit of B, A's failure to perform its
contractual obligation will result in A being held liable to B for
breach of contract.1 2 9 In Wicina v. Strecker3` 0 the issue was whether
a private high school owed a duty to a student-athlete to purchase
disability insurance that would protect the student-athlete from
financial loss caused by an injury suffered while participating in
a school-sponsored athletic activity.
Wicina, a sophomore football player at Bishop Miege High
School, suffered severe, permanent injuries during a game. The
student medical insurance policy obtained by the defendants (the
Catholic high school, the Catholic Archbishop, the school super-
intendent, the coprincipals of the school, and the insurance agent
responsible for advising the school) did not provide lifetime disa-
bility coverage for student athletes. The plaintiff alleged that an
insurance policy providing lifetime care expenses for catastrophi-
cally injured student-athletes was available to the high school
through the State High School Activities Association, but the
defendants decided not to purchase it.'"' The plaintiff also alleged
that the defendants had a duty and obligation to provide for the
protection of the student-athletes and that the defendants negli-
gently performed this duty by failing to properly insure the students
and by failing to properly advise the students and their parents
about the limitations of the coverage.13 2 The district court dismissed
128. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 35[2]-[3].
129. In Swanston v. McConnell Air Force Base Fed. Credit Union, 8 Kan. App. 2d
538, 661 P.2d 826 (1983), the Kansas Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in
not allowing the jury to consider whether representations by a credit union in promotional
material created a contract between the borrower and the credit union whereby the union
promised to procure insurance on the debtor's life sufficient to pay the debt in the event
of the debtor's death.
130. 242 Kan. 278, 747 P.2d 167 (1987).
131. Id. at 279, 747 P.2d at 169.
132. Id. at 280, 747 P.2d at 170.
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the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the defendants had
no duty to purchase or to advise the plaintiff about disability
insurance. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed.'33
The supreme court first examined section 72-8416 of Kansas
Statutes Annotated, which provides with regard to public school
districts that "the board of education of any school district may
purchase insurance contracts" against loss resulting from sickness
and injury suffered by students on school premises or during
school-sponsored activities.13 4 The court held that the plain lan-
guage of the statute did not require school districts to purchase
insurance for their students' benefit.'35
The plaintiff next argued that section 72-8501 of Kansas Statutes
Annotated, which provides that "the practice of teaching and its
related services, including school administration and supervisory
services, shall be designated as professional services," 3 6 created a
professional-care duty that the defendants breached by failing to
procure adequate insurance. The court rejected this argument as
well, stating that all of the cases recognizing a professional-care
duty involved educational malpractice or the act of teaching; thus,
these cases did not provide authority for recognizing a duty to
insure.'
The plaintiff also argued that the contract between the private
school and the student imposed a duty on the defendants to procure
insurance. The court noted, however, that the contract between
school and student had no express requirement about insurance,
and it was unwilling to make a new contract for the parties.'
The court distinguished cases in which insurance agents and brokers
have been held liable for failure to procure insurance, noting that
in the procurement of insurance, educators and school administra-
tors are not subject to the same standard of care as brokers and
agents. '9
Finally, the plaintiff advanced an argument based on the duty
of a volunteer: once the school district undertook to procure
insurance, it had a duty to perform this duty in a nonnegligent
manner. The defendants breached this duty, it was argued, by
failing to procure additional disability insurance. The court rejected
this argument, noting that the school performed fully what it
133. Id. at 279, 747 P.2d at 168.
134. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8416 (1985) (emphasis added).
135. Wicina, 242 Kan. at 282, 747 P.2d at 171.
136. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8501 (1985).
137. Wicina, 242 Kan. at 283, 747 P.2d at 172.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 284, 747 P.2d at 172.
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undertook to do, that is, to procure medical insurance. The school
did not undertake to procure disability insurance, and therefore
the plaintiff could not have relied on such an undertaking.140
Further, the court observed that the failure to obtain insurance
did not increase the plaintiff's risk of being injured and that the
plaintiff did not rely on the defendants' promise to procure insur-
ance when he decided to play football.141
The court also expressed sensitivity to placing no greater burdens
on private schools than the legislature placed on public schools.
The court believed that recognizing a duty in this instance would
cause private schools to provide no insurance at all, because no
liability would attach when the school opted to do nothing, as
opposed to the situation in which the school undertook to do
something, but then performed the task negligently.1 4 2 For all of
the foregoing reasons, the court held there was no common-law,
statutory, or contractual duty to properly insure or to advise the
plaintiff about the medical insurance purchased by the defendants
for the plaintiff.
Although Wicina was a unanimous decision, the case involves
more difficult issues than the court's unanimity suggests. That
football is a violent sport with occasionally serious and sometimes
catastrophic injuries is well known. Arguably, a school should no
more send student football players onto the practice or game field
without helmets than it should send them onto the field without
insurance for disabling injuries. Clearly, a school district would
be negligent for allowing student football players to engage in a
contact scrimmage without helmets; the injury is foreseeable, and
the lack of helmets will play an important causal role in the
students suffering injury.1 43 By the same token, it is arguably
negligent for a school district to allow student football players to
engage in a violent sport without adequately securing protection
against severe, foreseeable financial loss. By this analysis, the lack
of insurance plays a causal role between the injury-causing event
and the financial loss. Such a duty, if it exists, is a common-law
duty arising out of the fiduciary or contractual relationship existing
140. Id. at 286, 747 P.2d at 173.
141. Id. at 285-86, 747 P.2d at 173.
142. Id. at 286, 747 P.2d at 173.
143. The point about helmets shows the limitations and weaknesses in the volunteer
principle in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1963). If the school undertakes to
provide equipment for the players, and it provides no helmet, the school could be held
liable. To borrow from the court's analysis, using the volunteer principle as the predicate
for liability would induce schools to provide no equipment at all when sending players
onto the football field. This suggests that the volunteer principle is itself inapt, or the
court viewed it too narrowly.
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between school and student. The legislature's immunization of
public schools from this kind of common-law liability does not
necessarily mean that private schools should enjoy the same im-
munity.
The primary difficulty with the foregoing argument is determin-
ing when such a duty to procure insurance ends. Serious injuries
are less frequent in basketball, soccer, or swimming, but they
sometimes occur. If the school has a duty to procure insurance
for its students who play football, what about other sports? In
addition, if a duty to procure insurance exists, how much insurance
is necessary? Is it negligent to purchase anything less than lifetime
disability benefits in unlimited amounts? Insurance agents and
brokers are expected to act reasonably, not to assume the worst-
case scenario whenever they make recommendations to consumers.
Do student-athletes (meaning their parents or guardians) have a
duty to protect their own interests, thereby lessening any duty
owed by the school? After all, in Wicina, the student's family
could have purchased first-party insurance for the lifetime losses,
but apparently did not do so. Why should the school district bear
the risk of the failure of the student's family to protect against
these contingencies? Of course, the plaintiff alleged that the school
district failed to advise the student's family about the insurance
coverages and their limitations. Perhaps the plaintiff wanted to
argue that he trusted the school to provide adequate coverage, just
as he trusted the coaches to give him suitable equipment. But are
not the occurrence of these catastrophic losses as well known by
parents of football players as by school officials?
Wicina does not stand alone in holding that schools have no
duty to procure insurance for the benefit of their students.'"
Nevertheless, there is something troubling about the result in
Wicina. If the consternation does not stem from the observation
that going on the football field without disability insurance is as
ill-advised as going on the field without a helmet, it must stem
from the realization, illustrated once again by the facts of Wicina,
that our nation, as a whole, does a terrible job of providing for
the needs of victims of disabling injuries.
B. Private Right of Action under Unfair Trade Practices
Statute
All states have adopted the substance, and in many instances
the letter, of the NAIC's model act titled "An Act Relating to
144. The court relied extensively on Friederich v. Board of Educ., 59 Ill. App. 3d 79,




Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts
and Practices in the Business of Insurance."l 45 Kansas has adopted
most of the model act as the Kansas Uniform Trade Practices Act
("KUTPA"), codified at sections 40-2401 to 40-2414 of Kansas
Statutes Annotated. In several states, courts have considered whether
the statute affords a right of action to private parties, or whether
the legislature merely intended the statute as a mechanism for
administrative enforcement for the benefit of the public at large.
Most courts have held that only the insurance department or
commissioner has authority to bring an action based upon the act,
but there are a few decisions to the contrary. 14 6
In Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co.1 47 the Kansas
Supreme Court held that no tort of bad faith exists in first-party
insurance.1 4 8 In so holding, however, the court discussed the
KUPTA, noting that the existence of the detailed administrative
remedies in the statute cut against recognizing a judicial remedy
for first-party insureds aggrieved by their insurers' conduct. In
Earth Scientists (Petro Services) Ltd. v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. ,149 a federal district court decision, Judge O'Connor
concluded that the Kansas Supreme Court would not imply a
private cause of action under the KUPTA. Given the specific
language of the statute, which repeatedly refers to the "commis-
sioner's" power and authority, the existence of separate attorney
fee's statutes for successful insured-plaintiffs in some situations,
the legislature's specific provision for private causes of actions in
some other statutes, and the decisional authority in most other
jurisdictions, Judge O'Connor's prediction of how the Kansas
Supreme Court would decide the issue is probably correct. If no
private cause of action exists, thp individual insured aggrieved by
an unfair trade practice has two remedies: a suit on the insurance
contract or a report to the Insurance Commissioner who might
then commence a proceeding under the KUPTA.s0
C. Misrepresentation
As generally understood, the defense of misrepresentation is
described as follows:
145. II MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES (Nat'1 Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs) 900-
1 (Oct. 1988); see id. at 900-11 for respective statutes of adopting states.
146. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 25[b].
147. 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980).
148. See Jerry, supra note 7, at 298-300.
149. 619 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Kan. 1985).
150. Id. at 1470.
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A representation is a statement, either oral or written, made by the
insured to the insurer which forms at least part of the basis on which
the insurer decides to enter into the contract. If a representation (1) is
untrue or misleading, (2) is material to the risk, and (3) is relied upon
by the insurer in agreeing to issue the policy at a specified premium,
the insurer can void the policy or refuse a claim for payment of proceeds
on account of the misrepresentation (unless the policy has become
incontestable)."'
The foregoing statement, which accurately describes the approach
followed by most courts, does not include any requirement that
the misrepresentation be made intentionally, deliberately, or wil-
fully. A minority of courts have stated that an insurer has no
defense unless the insured intentionally committed the misrepre-
sentation, although it is important to note than many of these
cases involved misrepresentations of opinion (not fact), which
cannot exist in the absence of intent to deceive. 15 2
Recently, the Kansas Supreme Court articulated for the first
time a general test in an insurance law case for the misrepresen-
tation defense. This occurred in American States Insurance Co. v.
Ehrlich,'" in which the insurer sought to rescind a contract of
automobile liability insurance on the grounds that the coinsureds
fraudulently misrepresented their marital status. The court stated
that a fraudulent misrepresentation requires the following:
A statement by the insured as a fact of something which is untrue, and
which the insured states with the knowledge that it is untrue and with
an intent to deceive, or which he states positively as true without knowing
it to be true, and which has a tendency to mislead, where such fact in
either case is material to the risk.15 4
The issue in Ehrlich was whether the materiality element of the
test had been met. The court approved the test of materiality used
in virtually all jurisdictions: a representation is material if it induces
a reasonable insurer to enter into a contract that it would otherwise
have refused or to accept a lower premium than it would otherwise
have required."' As applied to the facts of Ehrlich, this meant the
insurer failed to carry its burden that the insured's misrepresen-
tation about his marital status was material to the risk covered by
his automobile insurance policy.15 6
151. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 102[a].
152. See generally id. §§ 102[a]-[f].
153. 237 Kan. 449, 701 P.2d 676 (1985).
154. Id. at 452, 701 P.2d at 679.
155. Id. at 453, 701 P.2d at 679. See generally R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 102[d].
156. Ehrlich, 237 Kan. at 454, 701 P.2d at 680.
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The court also observed that the trial court's refusal to cancel
the policy was correct because the insured failed to introduce any
evidence that it relied on the misrepresentation regarding marital
status. 5 7 The essence of reliance is inducement: the insurer must
be induced by the misrepresentation to issue the policy to the
insured. In many cases, it is possible to infer from a misrepresen-
tation's materiality that the insurer relied upon it." Ehrlich,
however, cautions insurers that raise the misrepresentation defense
to introduce specific evidence of reliance, and not to assume that
the evidence of materiality is sufficient to satisfy this other element
of the defense.
Although it did not affect the outcome of the case, the difficulty
with Ehrlich is the court's apparent endorsement of intent as an
element of the misrepresentation defense. Under the court's for-
mulation of the defense, in Kansas a negligent or accidental
misrepresentation is not a basis for a defense by the insurer, even
if the misrepresentation is material to the risk. In contract law,
when parties contract on the basis of mistaken information in
circumstances in which that information is basic to the contract
and has "a material effect on the agreed exchange of perform-
ances," the adversely affected party is entitled to rescission unless
that party bears the risk of the mistake.15 9 When an applicant for
insurance unintentionally conveys material, false information to
the insurer, and the insurer contracts on that basis without its own
fault or negligence, the insurer arguably should have no less right
to rescind under the insurance law's misrepresentation doctrine
than under contract law's mistake doctrine. As long as courts
recognize that many questions asked by insurers request the ap-
plicant to state belief instead of fact,'6o deleting the intent require-
ment from the test for establishing a misrepresentation would have
no adverse effect on applicants.
157. Id. at 455, 701 P.2d at 680.
158. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 102[e].
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981).
160. When the insurer asks, "Do you have a heart condition?" the insurer should be
understood to ask, "Do you believe that you have a heart condition?" When the applicant
answers "no" to the question when the applicant unknowingly has a heart condition, the
applicant has not misrepresented a fact because, regarding his belief whether he had a
heart condition, he answered the question truthfully and accurately. The question, "Have
you been hospitalized during the last year?" seeks a representation of fact, not belief. An
inaccurate answer, if material and relied upon, should give the insurer a defense. The




D. Other Insurance Clauses
To reduce the liability of the insurer when the insured possesses
multiple coverages on the same risk, almost all property, liability,
and health policies have "other insurance" clauses. These clauses
attempt to prioritize or coordinate the coverage of two or more
policies that apply to the same risk.161 Sometimes the other insur-
ance clauses in the multiple policies conflict. In Western Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.,162 a 1983
decision, the Kansas Supreme Court held that when other insurance
clauses are in irreconcilable conflict, the clauses are deemed to be
mutually repugnant and are to be disregarded. In such instances,
the loss is prorated equally up to the limits of the policy with the
lower limits.
Western Casualty involved a conflict between virtually identical
excess coverage clauses.'6 In the situation in which one insurer
has a pro rata clause and the other has an excess clause, it is
possible to "reconcile" the clauses by saying that the policy with
the excess clause provides coverage only after the pro rata policy
is exhausted. Most courts have so held.16
In Farmers Insurance Co. v. Prudential Property & Casualty
Insurance Co., 161 the Kansas Court of Appeals allowed an unin-
sured motorist insurer to rely upon an excess clause to escape
responsibility for contributing to a death-claim settlement. The
excess clause, as applied, made the insurer's responsibility second-
ary to that of the two other uninsured motorist carriers, who were
held to have primary responsibility for the loss. Picking, a passen-
ger in a vehicle operated by Miller, was killed when the Miller
vehicle collided head-on with another vehicle operated by Insley.
Insley was uninsured; Miller's vehicle was insured by plaintiffs
Farmers Insurance and Shelter Insurance. Farmers and Shelter
contributed equally to a settlement of Picking's heirs' wrongful
death action, and each sought contribution from Prudential, which
had issued insurance policies to Picking's mother covering three
vehicles. In other words, Picking was entitled to uninsured motorist
benefits under five policies issued by Farmers, Shelter, and Pru-
161. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 97.
162. 232 Kan. 606, 657 P.2d 576 (1983). This case is discussed in Jerry, supra note 7,
at 312-14.
163. Western Casualty was applied in Hennes Erecting Co. v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 813 F.2d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 1987), which involved two conflicting excess other
insurance clauses.
164. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 97[d][1].
165. 10 Kan. App. 2d 93, 692 P.2d 393 (1984).
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dential. Prudential, however, refused to contribute, arguing that
its policies were excess over the Farmer's and Shelter's policies by
virtue of an excess other insurance clause in the Prudential policies.
The plaintiffs argued that Prudential's clause diluted the cov-
erage required by the uninsured motorist statute, but the court of
appeals disagreed, noting that the loss suffered by Picking's heirs
was reimbursed in full by the Farmers and Shelter policies.'6
Accordingly, there was no frustration of the compensatory objec-
tive of the uninsured motorist statute. The court of appeals further
observed, as had the court in Western Casualty, that "there is no
reason that, once assured full coverage will be afforded the insured,
the insurers cannot be permitted to attempt to make their coverage
secondary to the coverage of others."'6  The court of appeals
acknowledged that "if several insurers have an equal claim to
secondary status, the provisions relied upon may be disregarded
as mutually repugnant and the insurers forced to share pro rata,"
as contemplated by Western Casualty.'61 The court noted, however,
that "if the circumstances permit only one insurer to rely on
another insurance clause to assert a secondary liability position,
enforcement of the resulting priority in a contribution action does
not violate public policy."'69 The logic of the court's opinion
suggests that if a pro rata clause collides with an excess clause,
the excess clause will be enforced, and the excess insurer will not
be forced to share pro rata with the other insurers.
This is exactly what the Court of Appeals later held in Western
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.17 0 Both
Western and Trinity issued policies of property insurance on a
tavern and its contents. Western's policy contained an excess
clause, whereas Trinity's policy contained a pro rata clause. Trinity
argued that the two clauses were mutually repugnant and that each
insurer should pay a pro rata share of the claim. Western argued
that it had no responsibility as the excess carrier until Trinity's
obligations were exhausted. After discussing the approaches various
courts around the nation have applied in this situation, the court
approved the approach followed by most courts that have faced
the question:
166. Although the Farmers and Shelter policies had a similar excess clause, it was
undisputed that the clauses were inapplicable because the named insureds under those
policies owned the car in which Picking was killed. Id. at 95, 692 P.2d at 395.
167. Id. at 97, 692 P.2d at 397.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 97-98, 692 P.2d at 397.
170. 13 Kan. App. 2d 133, 764 P.2d 1256 (1988).
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[Tihe policy containing the pro rata clause is other collectible primary
insurance which triggers the excess clause in the second policy. The
policy containing the excess clause is not considered to be other valid
and collectible primary insurance for the purpose of triggering the pro
rata clause. The policy containing the excess clause becomes secondary
coverage only."'
Whatever the limits of the Western Casualty rule, the rule can
be very difficult to apply in health insurance, which involves a
large number of claims for typically small amounts and in circum-
stances in which the coinsurance and deductible requirements of
the various policies are likely to differ. The Kansas Supreme Court
encountered this problem in Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v.
Riverside Hospital.172 Leslie Stadalman was insured under her
employer's group health plan (the "Riverside plan"). She was also
covered as a dependent on her husband's employer's group health
plan (the "BC-BS plan"). The Riverside plan refused to pay
Leslie's medical expenses on the ground that it provided coverage
secondary to that of the BC-BS plan. Initially, the BC-BS plan
refused to pay her claim for the same reason. Eventually, however,
the BC-BS plan paid her claim, reserving the right to seek contri-
bution and indemnity from Riverside. The BC-BS plan had a
complicated other insurance clause that explained when the BC-
BS plan would be primary and when it would be secondary; the
Riverside plan said that it was always secondary to other plans.
The district court held the other insurance clauses to be mutually
repugnant and directed that each plan pay half of the Stadalman
claim, in accordance with the Kansas Supreme Court's 1983 de-
cision. 73 The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with BC-BS, however,
that such a proration procedure when applied to employee health
care group plans has significant difficulties because of the differ-
ences in deductibles, covered services, and coinsurance provi-
sions.174 Accordingly, the court approved a different approach for
employee health care group plans: when other insurance clauses
can be reconciled, the court should do so; if the other insurance
clauses are in conflict, however, the insured's own coverage is
primary unless another group supplies primary coverage, and the
coverage for the insured as a dependent serves as secondary
coverage. 7 1 In this instance the court said that the Riverside plan
was primary, and the BC-BS plan was secondary. This meant that
171. Id. at 141, 764 P.2d at 1263.
172. 237 Kan. 829, 703 P.2d 1384 (1985).
173. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
174. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 237 Kan. at 835-36, 703 P.2d at 1390.
175. Id. at 836-37, 703 P.2d at 1390-91.
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the entire claim was to be charged against Riverside, in a precise
amount to be determined upon remand.1 7 6
To what extent the court in Riverside Hospital modified the
Western Casualty rule is not clear. At a minimum, Western Cas-
ualty is superseded for employee health care group plans. Presum-
ably Riverside Hospital would be followed for a group health
insurance plan offered outside the employment setting, and it seems
likely the rule would be followed for individual health insurance
plans. Clearly, Western Casualty remains good law for automobile
insurance plans, the situation in which that case arose. It would
seem that Western Casualty remains good law for other property
and liability insurance plans, but the court's willingness to revise
the rules in the health care situation could open the door to re-
examination of the rules in other settings. This will occur, however,
only if there is an insurer willing to expend the time, energy, and
resources to seek a reversal of a rule that makes considerable sense
outside the health insurance setting.
V. AUTOMOBILES
A. Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Hit-and-Run Accidents
One of the reasons uninsured motorist coverage was offered by
insurers and later made mandatory in some states was the preva-
lence of hit-and-run accidents. Compulsory liability insurance sta-
tutes provided no protection for the victim of an accident if the
tortfeasor could not be identified."' Although the problem is
obvious, the solution is not so clear. On the one hand, the public
policy of maximizing coverage for victims of accidents favors the
broadest coverage possible. This suggests that whenever a third
party causes an accident and leaves the scene, the victim should
be able to reach the uninsured motorist coverage. On the other
hand, if no restrictions are put on coverage, any insured could
claim in any one-vehicle accident that the incident was caused by
an unknown third party's negligent conduct and thereby recover
proceeds under the uninsured motorist coverage.
Some states have sought to reconcile these competing interests
by either requiring a physical contact as a prerequisite to recovering
uninsured motorist benefits or permitting the insurer to exclude
such coverage in the absence of a contact. In other states, the
physical contact requirement is specifically prohibited by statute.
176. Id.
177. See R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 131, at 643-44.
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In states without statutory guidance, some courts have upheld
physical contact requirements in insurance policies, but a slightly
greater number of courts have held such requirements contrary to
public policy and therefore invalid.178 Kansas has resolved the issue
in this manner: section 40-284(e)(3) of Kansas Statutes Annotated
allows insurers to exclude coverage for hit-and-run accidents when
there is no physical contact and no competent evidence to prove
the facts of the accident from a disinterested witness not making
a claim under the policy.179 In other words, an insured in Kansas
can recover uninsured motorist benefits in the absence of a physical
contact, but only if a disinterested witness is able to provide
evidence corroborating the insured's claim that an unknown third
party's negligence caused the loss.
In Clements v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,1so the
Kansas Supreme Court considered whether section 40-284(e)(3) was
unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the United States and Kansas Constitutions.'"'
The plaintiff suffered injury when the car she was driving hit a
utility pole. She claimed she was forced off the road when an
unidentified vehicle cut in front of her. No physical contact with
that vehicle occurred, and no one else witnessed the accident. The
insurer refused to pay the claim, which fell squarely within the
exclusion to the policy.
The court observed that section 40-284 specifies the minimum
amount of uninsured motorist coverage that must be purchased
and does not limit the maximum coverage allowed. Therefore, the
authorization of an exclusion to the coverage does not violate a
fundamental right protected by either the federal or state consti-
tutions.18 2 The court also observed that the insured was not fore-
178. Id. § 133[d]. This was the result in Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 225 Kan. 508,
592 P.2d 445 (1979), in which the court held that physical contact clauses were attempts
to dilute the broad coverage mandated by statute and thus offended public policy. Id. at
515, 592 P.2d at 450. In response to Simpson, the legislature in 1981 amended KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-284 to authorize the physical contact requirement. In 1984 the disinterested
witness language was added to the statute. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
179. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(e)(3) (1986 & Supp. 1988).
180. 243 Kan. 124, 753 P.2d 1274 (1988).
181. The plaintiff also argued that KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(e)(3) violated the "right
to a remedy" provision in § 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights. Clements, 243 Kan. at 128,
753 P.2d at 1277. The court found no infringement of § 18, which the court stated creates
no rights of action but only requires that Kansas courts be open and afford remedies for
such wrongs that are recognized by law. If the plaintiff's injury is not a wrong for which
a remedy is recognized by law, the plaintiff has no constitutional right under § 18 that is
vulnerable to infringement. Id. at 128-29, 753 P.2d at 1277-78.
182. Clements, 243 Kan. at 124, 753 P.2d at 1275.
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closed from purchasing uninsured motorist protection for losses
caused in the absence of physical contact; therefore, none of her
rights was violated by the statute.18 3 To buttress this conclusion,
the court noted that the physical contact requirement is a reason-
able basis for classification and bears a rational basis to the
objective sought, namely, reducing fraudulent claims. As such, the
authorization of the exclusion does not present a due process or
equal protection problem.'84
B. Underinsured Coverage
As of 1981 Kansas law required automobile liability insurers to
offer, separate from the mandatory liability insurance, uninsured
motorist coverage, but there was no requirement for underinsured
coverage. Effective January 1, 1982, the Kansas uninsured motorist
statute was amended in two major respects."" First, uninsured
motorist insurance became mandatory. Insureds could purchase
either an amount of uninsured motorist insurance equal to their
liability limits, or an amount equal to the mandatory minimum
liability coverage. Second, the new statute required that uninsured
motorist insurance also contain "underinsured" motorist coverage.
Under the new underinsured coverage, the insured could collect
from the insured's own insurer any damages for injury or death
exceeding the liability coverage of the tortfeasor, but in no event
could the insured's recovery exceed the insured's own uninsured
motorist coverage.
In Haas v. Freeman,186 the issue was whether the plaintiff-insured
could name his own insurer, which was potentially liable as the
underinsured carrier, as a defendant in his action against the
tortfeasor. In the uninsured motorist situation, a plaintiff-insured
may sue the uninsured carrier directly without joining the tortfea-
sor, may sue the uninsured carrier and the tortfeasors in one
action, or may sue the tortfeasors alone without joining the
insurer.'18 The plaintiff in Haas sought to apply the uninsured
motorist rule to the underinsured setting. The court, however,
noted some differences between the uninsured and the underinsured
setting: (1) the underinsured case always involves an active oppos-
ing party plus that party's insurer, unlike the uninsured situation;
183. Id. at 129, 753 P.2d at 1278.
184. Id.
185. Act approved Apr. 24, 1981, ch. 191, 1981 Kan. Sess. Laws 836 (codified as
amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284 (1986 & Supp. 1988)).
186. 236 Kan. 677, 693 P.2d 1199 (1985).
187. See Winner v. Ratzlaff, 211 Kan. 59, 65, 505 P.2d 606, 611 (1973).
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(2) whether an underinsured situation exists is an unresolved issue
until the amount of damages is finally adjudicated, whereas lack
of insurance altogether is known at the very beginning; and (3)
having two insurers as defendants, which is impossible in the
uninsured setting, could confuse the jury.18 Accordingly, the court
set forth the following procedures for an underinsured coverage
situation. First, the injured insured shall notify the insured's own
carrier that he wishes to invoke the underinsurance coverage in
the manner specified in his policy. Second, the insurer may inter-
vene at its election; if it elects to intervene, it shall be named as
a party; if it elects not to intervene, section 60-454 of Kansas
Statutes Annotated' 9 shall apply. Third, in either case, the under-
insured carrier shall be bound by any judgment obtained in the
action. '9
In 1985 the Special Committee on Financial Institutions and
Insurance considered proposed reforms to the uninsured and un-
derinsured motorist statute. The Special Committee focused on the
"offset provision" of section 40-284(b) of Kansas Statutes
Annotated 9 ' and ultimately decided to recommend no change in
that provision. In the course of the Committee's deliberations,
however, a problem surfaced concerning how the victim's insurer
could protect its right of subrogation while simultaneously meeting
its other obligations. The Committee recommended a solution,
which was enacted in 1986 with only slight modifications and was
codified at section 40-284(f) of Kansas Statutes Annotated. This
section recognizes that an underinsured carrier "shall have sub-
rogation rights under the provisions of K.S.A. 40-287 and amend-
ments thereto."l 92 If a victim reaches a "tentative agreement to
settle for liability limits" with the underinsured tortfeasor, the
insured must give written notice via certified mail to the underin-
sured carrier. Then, within sixty days of the receipt of this notice,
the underinsured carrier "may substitute its payment to the insured
188. Haas, 236 Kan. at 682, 693 P.2d at 1203.
189. "Evidence that a person was, at the time a harm was suffered by another, insured
wholly or partially against loss arising from liability for that harm is inadmissible as tending
to prove negligence or other wrongdoing." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-454 (1983).
190. Haas, 236 Kan. at 683, 693 P.2d at 1204.
191. The "offset provision" is the "to the extent" clause of KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
284(b) (1986). This provision limits the victim's recovery through underinsurance to the
amount by which the victim's uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the tortfeasor's liability
coverage. Another way to view the offset is as a prohibition on stacking the tortfeasor's
liability coverage onto the victim's underinsured coverage. If, for example, the victim's
uninsured motorist coverage is at the minimum, and the tortfeasor's liability insurance is
at the minimum, the victim collects no underinsured benefit.
192. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(f) (1986).
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for the tentative settlement amount. The underinsured motorist
coverage insurer is then subrogated to the insured's right of
recovery to the extent of such payment and any settlement under
the underinsured motorist coverage."'19 If the underinsured carrier
fails to pay the insured the amount of the tentative settlement
within sixty days, the underinsured carrier loses its right to sub-
rogation. The effect of this statute is to eliminate the difficult
entanglements created when the victim attempts to procure the
limits of the tortfeasor's insurance; the settlement arguably would
discharge the tortfeasor's liability, thereby quashing the underin-
sured carrier's subrogation right. Concern over these consequences
had the effect, as the Special Committee explained, of leading "to
situations in which neither party [would] take the initial step toward
settlement of the claim." 9 4
One effect of section 40-284(f) in situations in which the insured's
injury exceeds the limits of the insured's uninsured motorist cov-
erage is to give the insurer a subrogation right before the insured
is made whole. This is not the common-law rule in Kansas.'95 In
other words, under the statute, if an insured with an injury
exceeding the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage proposes
to settle with the tortfeasor's insurer for the policy limits of the
tortfeasor's insurance, the victim's insurer is entitled to assert a
subrogation right against the proceeds paid by the tortfeasor's
insurer, even though the victim is not made whole. For example,
193. Id.
194. Re: Proposal No. 13-Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists, in REPORT ON
KANSAS LEGISLATIVE INTERIM STUDIES TO THE 1986 LEGISLATURE at 129, 133 (1985). Another
difficulty is illustrated by the pre-section 40-284(f) decision in Horace Mann Ins. Co. v.
Ammerman, 630 F. Supp. 114 (D. Kan. 1986). Ammerman, who was killed in an auto
accident in which the other car's driver (Chadwick) was negligent, had underinsured coverage
with Horace Mann of $250,000. Chadwick had liability coverage of $50,000. Ammerman's
widow gave Chadwick a release in exchange for the $50,000 limits. The release stated that
Ammerman's widow retained the right to seek underinsured benefits from Ammerman's
insurer with the intention that Horace Mann would retain a subrogation right. Horace
Mann later argued that the release quashed its subrogation rights, thereby making the
underinsured coverage void. Ammerman's widow sought the $200,000 difference from
Horace Mann. The court ultimately decided the case in favor of the insured's widow. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-284(f) makes clear that the insurer does not lose its subrogation right
when the insured reaches a "tentative agreement" with the tortfeasor's insurer and that
the insurer does not acquire a subrogation right until the underinsured carrier pays the
insured in substitution for the tentative settlement amount. For further discussion, see
Scott, General Analysis of Kansas Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Statute, in S. FABERT,
R. FISHER, P. HASTY, & G. ScoTT, CURRENT ISSUES IN KANSAS AUTO INSURANCE 104-07
(1988).
195. See Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 237 Kan. 873, 704 P.2d 372 (1985);
Halpin v. Frankenberger, 231 Kan. 344, 350-51, 644 P.2d 452, 455 (1982).
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assume an insured suffers a 100,000-dollar loss, the insured has
60,000 dollars in uninsured motorist benefits, and the tortfeasor
has a 50,000-dollar liability policy. The insured proposes to settle
with the tortfeasor in exchange for the tortfeasor's insurer's pay-
ment of 50,000 dollars. The insured's carrier then has the option
to substitute its payment to the insured (60,000 dollars) for the
tentative settlement amount, but the insured's carrier is then sub-
rogated to the insured's claim against the tortfeasor. Upon exer-
cising this subrogation right, the insured's carrier will recover
50,000 dollars from the tortfeasor's insurer. Thus, when all rights
have been asserted, the liability carrier will have paid 50,000
dollars, and the insured's carrier will have paid 10,000 dollars.
Entitling the insurer to a subrogation right before the insured is
made whole would no doubt seem unfair to the victim whose loss
has not been fully compensated. Insureds might wish to believe
that underinsured coverage means that when they are not made
whole by the victim's liability insurance they can look to their own
insurer for the difference, but this is not what the statute provides.
Indeed, this result does not differ from what can happen under
the stacking prohibitions now found in the insurance statutes.'9
An insured may have access to multiple coverages, but the insured
can only collect once, even though the insured's loss is not fully
compensated. One answer to the argument that antistacking pro-
visions are unfair is that the insured should purchase more coverage
under one policy. In the underinsured setting, the answer is that
the insured, to avoid a loss exceeding policy limits, should purchase
more uninsured motorist insurance.
C. The No-Fault Statute
1. PIP Benefits and Limitations on the Right to Sue in Tort
In 1987 the personal injury protection benefits and tort threshold
of the Kansas Automobile Insurance Reparations Act ("KAIRA")
were amended, effective January 1, 1988. Each of the six categories
of minimum PIP benefits required in every automobile policy were
increased. The minimum disability benefits and survivors benefits
were increased from a maximum of not less than 650 dollars per
month to 900 dollars per month. Funeral benefits were increased
from 1000 dollars to 2000 dollars per individual. Medical benefits
196. Stacking of uninsured motorist coverages is prohibited, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
284(d) (1986), stacking of PIP coverages is prohibited, id. § 40-3109(b), and insurers are
authorized to insert provisions prohibiting stacking of liability coverages. Id. § 40-3107(i)(5).
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were increased from a limit of not less than 2000 dollars to 4500
dollars. Rehabilitation benefits were increased from a limit of not
less than 2000 dollars to 4500 dollars. Substitution benefits were
increased from a maximum of twelve dollars per day to twenty-
five dollars per day. 97
Whenever mandatory first-party benefits are increased, premiums
must increase unless some cost savings are achieved elsewhere in
the compensation system. In most no-fault statutory schemes, these
savings are achieved by eliminating the victim's right to sue in tort
for some kinds of damages below stated thresholds. Since 1974 a
Kansas accident victim cannot sue in tort for "pain, suffering,
mental anguish, inconvenience and other non-pecuniary loss be-
cause of injury" unless the injury either requires medical treatment
costing at least 500 dollars or meets a verbal threshold. 98 Effective
January 1, 1988, the monetary threshold was raised to 2,000
dollars.'" It is only partially accurate to assert that the legislature
in 1987 made Kansas a stronger no-fault state because the legis-
lature merely corrected for the erosion in the threshold (as well as
the erosion in the value of the mandatory PIP benefits) caused by
inflation during the years after 1974.
Prior to 1988 the Kansas no-fault scheme was "in balance" in
the sense that the savings achieved by restricting the right to sue
in tort were sufficient to pay for the mandatory first-party bene-
fits.20 According to a Department of Transportation report, au-
tomobile insurance premiums in Kansas were nine percent lower
in 1983 than they would have been if the no-fault law had not
been enacted. 2 0 1 The report also revealed that this inflation-re-
straining effect occurred at the same time more benefits were
provided to accident victims than were provided in the average
traditional tort-liability jurisdiction. 2 0 2 In short, prior to 1988 the
197. Act effective Jan. 1, 1988, ch. 173, 1987 Kan. Sess. Laws 848, 849 (codified at
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3103 (1986 & Supp. 1988)).
198. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3117. As an alternative to the monetary threshold in § 40-
3117, if the victim's injury "consists in whole or in part of permanent disfigurement, a
fracture to a weightbearing bone, a compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed
fracture, loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability,
permanent loss of a bodily function or death," the victim retains the right to sue in tort
for noneconomic loss. Id.
199. Act approved May 14, 1987, ch. 173, 1987 Kan. Sess. Laws 848, 859.
200. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING AuTO ACCIDENT VICTms: A FOLLOW-UP
REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INsURANCE EXPERIENCES 4, 31 (May 1985).
201. Id. at 31.
202. The average traditional liability state returned 43.2 cents of every premium dollar
to claimants in the form of benefits, whereas Kansas returned 47.0 cents of every dollar.
Id. at 4, 31.
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evidence indicates that the Kansas no-fault system was working
well and was achieving its goals, and there is no reason to think
this is still not the case. Whenever first-party benefits are enhanced,
however, a chance exists that the no-fault scheme might become
out-of-balance, as it has in several states where legislatures have
mandated broader benefits but failed to adjust the right-to-sue
threshold sufficiently upward to generate the savings that hold
premium increases in check. 203 A fair prediction is that the Kansas
statutory scheme will remain in balance, but only some experience
with the new benefit levels and threshold can validate this predic-
tion.
In Stang v. Caragianis,m the supreme court reconsidered the
meaning of the verbal threshold in section 40-3117 of Kansas
Statutes Annotated. Plaintiff Stang, a passenger in an automobile,
sought to recover damages from the defendant for injuries suffered
when the vehicle in which she was riding collided with the defen-
dant's vehicle. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the
defendant limiting the plaintiff's recovery to ninety percent of her
pecuniary losses on the ground that the threshold in section 40-
3117 had not been met, thereby foreclosing the plaintiff from
seeking nonpecuniary damages.
The plaintiff asked the court to reconsider its 1978 decision in
Smith v. Marshall, 2 05 in which the court held that the verbal
threshold "permanent disfigurement" in the statute requires a
disfigurement "of substance," meaning an injury of some severity
and seriousness. In Smith, the court affirmed the trial court's
finding that an innocuous discoloration of the victim's leg extend-
ing approximately one and one-fourth inches in length and about
one-half inch in width at its widest point was not a "permanent
disfigurement" as a matter of law. The court rejected the plaintiff's
request, noting that most courts since Smith that have considered
the issue have required the disfigurement to be "significant as well
as permanent." 206 The court also refused to overturn the jury's
determination that a scar on the plaintiff's cheek approximately
five sonometers in length and one sonometer in width did not
constitute a permanent disfigurement .207 The plaintiff contended
that the trial court erred in letting the jury decide whether the
threshold was reached. The court rejected this contention, explain-
203. Id. at 15-17.
204. 243 Kan. 249, 757 P.2d 279 (1988).
205. 225 Kan. 70, 587 P.2d 320 (1978).
206. Stang, 243 Kan. at 256, 757 P.2d at 285.
207. Id. at 256-57, 757 P.2d at 285-86.
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ing that its approval of the trial court's ruling in Smith that no
permanent disfigurement had occurred as a matter of law did not
mean that all such determinations in the future would have to be
made by the trial judge, instead of a jury.20 8
2. Subrogation and PIP Benefits
Under section 40-3113a of Kansas Statutes Annotated, whenever
an insured who has received PIP benefits suffers injuries that cross
the threshold in section 40-3117, the PIP insurer enjoys a right of
subrogation against the tortfeasor to the extent of "duplicative
personal injury protection benefits provided to date of such re-
covery and [the insurer] shall have a lien therefore against such
recovery. . . ." 20 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Kroeker,2 10 the court examined the meaning of this provision.
The defendant's husband was fatally injured in an automobile
collision in which the other driver was entirely at fault. State Farm
not only insured the defendant's husband but also had issued a
50,000-dollar liability policy to the negligent driver. State Farm
paid PIP benefits to the defendant, and offered to settle the
negligent driver's liability for 50,000 dollars less a setoff for PIP
benefits already paid. State Farm justified this offer by contending
that in its status as the deceased husband's insurer, it enjoyed a
subrogation right against the 50,000-dollar payment to the extent
of PIP benefits paid. The defendant argued that her loss far
exceeded the 50,000 dollars tendered by State Farm and that the
liability insurance proceeds were not duplicative of PIP benefits
paid to her.
In 1977, in Easom v. Farmers Insurance Co.,211 the court an-
nounced three rules to be applied when a PIP insurer claims a
208. Id. at 258, 757 P.2d at 286. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the threshold requirements are affirmative defenses under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-208(c),
which were allegedly waived by the defendant when the defendant failed to raise them
before trial. Instead, the threshold is an element of the plaintiff's case on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Stang, 243 Kan. at 250-52, 757 P.2d at 281-82. In
addition, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that services performed for her by her
husband after the accident could be counted toward meeting the $500 medical expense
threshold. Id. at 258-59, 757 P.2d at 286-87. The court concluded that the trial court erred
in submitting to the jury any claim based on the plaintiff's loss of earning capacity as a
model, where the only evidence was that the plaintiff aspired to be a model and there was
no evidence that the aspiration was realistic or that the claimed disfigurement impaired
that aspiration. Id. at 260, 757 P.2d at 287-88.
209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3113a(b) (Supp. 1988).
210. 234 Kan. 636, 676 P.2d 66 (1984).
211. 221 Kan. 415, 560 P.2d 117 (1977).
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right to reimbursement out of the insured's recovery against a
tortfeasor: (1) the PIP insurer's right to reimbursement for PIP
benefits paid is limited to damages recovered by the insured that
are "duplicative" of the PIP benefits; (2) such damages duplicate
the PIP benefits when failing to reimburse the PIP insurer would
result in double recovery by the insured; (3) PIP benefits are
presumed to be included in any recovery obtained by an injured
insured, whether by judgment or settlement, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, and the burden to supply such proof is on
the insured. 21 2 Two years later the court elaborated upon Easom,
holding in Russell v. Mackey213 that when the insured settles all
of the insured's claim, including elements of damage represented
by PIP benefits, the recovery obtained is duplicative, and the
insurer is entitled to reimbursement. The lesson of Russell is that
an injured insured should not settle all of the insured's claim, but
should attempt to get only a partial settlement. If this is not
feasible, the insured should attempt to work out a settlement with
the PIP insurer for a reduction in the amount to be paid for a
settlement of the insurer's subrogation rights.
Under the facts of Kroeker, the court concluded that the insured
had not obtained a settlement of all of her claim, but instead had
only reached a partial settlement with the tortfeasor's estate. The
defendant-insured obtained a judgment against the estate for slightly
over 600,000 dollars, which, after payment of the 50,000 dollars
in liability proceeds, would leave unreimbursed damages of slightly
over 550,000 dollars. The court ordered a remand of the case to
the district court, where defendant would be allowed to present
evidence that the 50,000 dollars in proceeds did not afford her a
double recovery. The court stated: "Clearly the payment of the
entire $50,000 to the insured Kroeker will not result in a double
recovery, if it can be shown that her actual damages exceeded
$50,000 plus the $5,550 PIP benefits previously paid." 2 1 4
Kroeker was reaffirmed in Kansas Farm Bureau Insurance Co.
v. Miller,2 15 a 1985 decision. Foley, a passenger, suffered permanent
injuries when the vehicle driven by Miller was involved in a one-
car accident. Miller had 15,000 dollars in liability coverage plus
the PIP benefits required by law. Foley was covered for PIP
benefits under seven policies carried by his father on various
212. These three rules were summarized in Kroeker, 234 Kan. at 643-44, 676 P.2d at
73.
213. 225 Kan. 588, 592 P.2d 902 (1979).
214. Kroeker, 234 Kan. at 647, 676 P.2d at 75 (emphasis in original).
215. 236 Kan. 811, 696 P.2d 961 (1985).
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vehicles. Miller's liability insurer, Hartford, happened to be the
same insurer on one of the seven Foley vehicles. Hartford paid
Foley over 9000 dollars in PIP benefits, and then sought pro rata
reimbursement from the carriers on the other six policies. Hartford,
in an effort to settle its liability as Miller's insurer, proposed to
settle Foley's case by paying the full 15,000 dollars to Foley on
the condition that the other carriers waive their subrogation rights
to the amounts to be paid by them as PIP benefits. One of the
carriers, Farm Bureau, which had policies on four of the Foley
vehicles, refused to waive its subrogation claim. It was stipulated
by the parties that Foley's damages for bodily injuries had a value
of not less than 75,000 dollars, which was well beyond the liability
coverage available. Applying Kroeker, the court ruled that the PIP
insurers were not entitled to subrogation because their payments
were not duplicative of the 15,000 dollars to be paid by Hartford
in its capacity as the liability insurer.2 16
When read together, Kroeker and Miller make it clear that the
PIP insurer is not entitled to subrogation if the value of the
insured's claim exceeds the liability proceeds plus the PIP payments
made. If the insured settles with the tortfeasor for the entire claim,
however, the PIP insurer is entitled to subrogation.
It is interesting to note that only the first sentence in section
40-3113a(b) applies to the situation in which PIP benefits have
already been paid, and this is the sentence that limits the insurer's
subrogation rights by use of the term "duplicative"-the insurer
is subrogated only to the extent of duplicative PIP benefits. The
second sentence of section 40-3113a(b) applies to the situation in
which the insured obtains a judgment before the completion of
the payment of PIP benefits, and this sentence does not use the
word "duplicative." The second sentence states that when such a
judgment or settlement occurs, and when that judgment exceeds
the amount of PIP benefits already paid, the settlement or recovery
shall be credited against future payments of such PIP benefits.
The Insurance Commissioner interprets the statute as giving the
insurer a subrogation right only when the recovery duplicates PIP
benefits, regardless of when the judgment is obtained.2 1  The
Commissioner's interpretation reads the second sentence as a mere
extension of the principle of the first sentence in the situation in
216. Id. at 818, 696 P.2d at 967.
217. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 40-3-39 (Supp. 1987) provides: "The phrase 'the amount of
such judgment, settlement, or recovery,' as contained in and applied to, the second sentence




which the judgment precedes the conclusion of the payment of
benefits. The statute can be read as creating an either-or situation,
however, and when the judgment precedes the paying of benefits,
there is a dollar-for-dollar credit of the judgment against the
insurer's obligation to make future PIP payments. This latter
reading draws support from the court's observation in Kroeker
that the word "duplicative" was inserted in section 40-3113a(b),
but was left out of section 40-287, the subrogation section of
uninsured motorist benefits. 2 18 The argument is that the legislature
had a special purpose in inserting the word "duplicative" in section
40-3113a(b), the legislature knew what it was doing, and the
legislature must have also known what it was doing when it did
not insert the word "duplicative" in the second sentence of section
40-3113a(b). By this analysis, the second sentence of section 40-
3113a(b) gives the insurer a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement, just
like section 40-287. Clarification of this issue must await a future
case.
D. The Household Exclusion
The "household exclusion" is sometimes found in the liability
coverages of automobile insurance policies. The provision typically
states that no coverage exists for any obligation an insured may
have to a member of the insured's family who is residing in the
same household as the insured. The purpose of the clause is to
eliminate coverage when one family member's negligence injures
another family member. The insurer's main concern is, of course,
familial collusion: the negligent family member may assist the
injured family member in securing a judgment and recovering
proceeds .219
The fear of collusion reflected in the household exclusion is also
the underpinning of the intrafamily immunities. In many states,
including Kansas, the doctrines of interspousal and parent-child
immunities have been eroded. 220 To the extent it is the state's
policy to limit these immunities and to allow tort claims to be
asserted in the intrafamily setting to compensate victims of acci-
dents, the household exclusion frustrates the state's purpose by
218. Kroeker, 234 Kan. at 647, 676 P.2d at 75.
219. See generally R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 135C.
220. See Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980) (abolishing
parent-child immunity at least with respect to automobile accidents); Flagg v. Loy, 241
Kan. 216, 734 P.2d 1183 (1987) (overruling Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 631 P.2d 646
(1981), and abolishing interspousal immunity).
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allowing liability insurers to deny coverage when the tort claim is
asserted. 22 1
In 1980 the Kansas Supreme Court abrogated the parent-child
immunity in automobile accidents. 22 2 At that time, however, Kansas
recognized the doctrine of interspousal immunity, and this was
confirmed in a 1981 decision. 2 2 3 Thus, as a practical matter, in
1980 the household exclusion only prevented children from seeking
a recovery from their parents for negligently operating a vehicle.
In 1981, in DeWitt v. Young,224 the supreme court held a household
exclusion invalid on the ground that it frustrated the policy and
objectives of the KAIRA. The legislature responded shortly there-
after by amending the KAIRA to authorize household exclusion
clauses. 225
In 1984, however, the statute authorizing household exclusions
was repealed, effective July 1, 1984.226 This presumably returned
Kansas to the situation that prevailed under the DeWitt decision:
household exclusions are invalid. This is suggested in Justice Herd's
opinion in Hilyard v. Estate of Clearwater.227 Hilyard was actually
a consolidation of two cases, in which the issue in each was the
validity of the household exclusion. In both cases, minor children
were suing their parents for damages suffered as a result of the
parents' negligent operation of a motor vehicle in which the
children were passengers. Both accidents occurred in 1983, before
the repeal of the household exclusion authorization statute. The
supreme court refused to apply the repeal retroactively, which
meant that the household exclusions were valid in each case. 2 2 8 In
dictum, however, Justice Herd stated that if the repeal of the
household exclusion authorization were retroactive, "[tihis would
render the household exclusion clause in State Farm's policies
invalid. "229
The importance of DeWitt and the 1984 repeal of the household
exclusion authorization became greater in 1987, when the supreme
court overruled prior case law and abolished the doctrine of
221. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 135C, at 676.
222. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. at 758, 611 P.2d at 135.
223. See Guffy, 230 Kan. at 89, 631 P.2d at 646.
224. 229 Kan. 474, 625 P.2d 478 (1981).
225. Act approved Apr. 24, 1981, ch. 191, § 2(i)(1), 1981 Kan. Sess. Laws 836, 839
(repealed 1984).
226. Act approved Apr. 13, 1984, ch. 167, § 2, 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws 798, 801; Act
approved May 9, 1984, ch. 175, § 1, 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws 855, 857.
227. 240 Kan. 362, 729 P.2d 1195 (1986).
228. Id. at 366, 729 P.2d at 1198.
229. Id. at 365, 729 P.2d at 1197.
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interspousal immunity. 23 0 Thus, in Kansas, it is now possible for
a family member to bring a tort action against another family
member for negligence arising out of an auto accident. Presumably,
any effort by an insurer to exclude liability coverage is- invalid
under the authority of DeWitt and the repeal of the statute that
reversed DeWitt.
E. Notification Requirements for Cancellation of Policy
In the 1960s general public concern about the availability and
affordability of automobile insurance ultimately caused attention
to be focused on the cancellation procedures used by some insurers.
Eventually, legislatures in many states enacted statutes limiting
insurers' rights to cancel automobile policies. These statutes typi-
cally detailed the procedures that insurers must follow to cancel a
policy, and a common requirement is that the insurer notify the
insured to effect a cancellation. 231
In most cases in which the propriety of a cancellation is at issue,
the insured challenges the procedures followed by the insurer in
canceling the policy. The most common targets of these procedural
attacks are the nature and sufficiency of the notice. Courts have
reached diverse results in these cases; some courts require proof
of actual receipt of the notice by the insured, whereas other courts
simply require that the insurer establish that the cancellation notice
was deposited in the mail pursuant to the company's ordinary
business practices 232
In 1960 the Kansas Supreme Court held in Koehn v. Central
National Insurance Co. 233 that a standard cancellation clause in an
automobile insurance policy, which stated that the "mailing of
notice . . . shall be sufficient proof of notice," 23 4 required actual
receipt of the cancellation notice by the policyholder. In Richmeier
v. Williams,235 a 1984 Kansas Court of Appeals decision, the court
held, relying on Koehn, that an insurer's mailing of a notice of
cancellation of an automobile policy for nonpayment of premium
was not effective unless actually received by the insured. The policy
in Richmeier stated that it might be canceled during the policy
period "by mailing to the named insured . . . at least 10 days
230. Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 734 P.2d 1183 (1987).
231. R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 62A[3].
232. Id. at 284.
233. 187 Kan. 192, 354 P.2d 352 (1960).
234. Id. at 193, 354 P.2d at 353 (emphasis omitted).
235. 9 Kan. App. 2d 222, 675 P.2d 372 (1984).
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notice . . . if cancellation is for nonpayment of premium." 2 36 The
court noted that section 40-3118(b) of Kansas Statutes Annotated,
which had been enacted after Koehn, lacked any express require-
ment of notice when the cancellation is for nonpayment of pre-
mum:
[E]xcept for termination of insurance resulting from nonpayment of
premium . . . , no motor vehicle liability insurance policy, or any renewal
thereof, shall be terminated by cancellation or failure to renew by the
insurer until at least 30 days after mailing a notice of termination, by
certified or registered mail or United States post office certificate of
mailing, to the named insured at the latest address filed with the insurer
by or on behalf of the insured.237
In the court's view, this statute did not alter the insurer's con-
tractual undertakings, which it interpreted, again relying on Koehn,
to require actual notice when the nonrenewal is for failure to pay
the premium.
The supreme court revisited the cancellation area in Feldt v.
Union Insurance Co. 238 The insurer sought to cancel the insured's
automobile policy because of misrepresentations by the insured
about his driving record. The insurer mailed the notice to the
insured's last known address, but the insured alleged that he never
received the notice because he was temporarily staying at a different
address while his parents were vacationing out of the country. The
district court granted summary judgment for the insurer, but the
court of appeals reversed, relying on Koehn and Richmeier. The
supreme court, in reinstating the district court's judgment, held
that section 40-3118(b) "clearly does not require the insurer to
provide proof of actual receipt by the insured." 23 9 It is only
necessary for the insurer to mail notice of termination by certified
or registered mail, or United States Post Office certificate of
mailing, to the insured at the last address provided by the in-
sured.2 4 0 The court reasoned that section 40-3118(b) constituted a
clear rejection of the rule articulated in Koehn. 2 4 1
236. Id. at 223-24, 675 P.2d at 374.
237. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3118(b) (1986).
238. 240 Kan. 108, 726 P.2d 1341 (1986).
239. Id. at 111, 726 P.2d at 1343.
240. Certified or registered mail has a "tracking" mechanism because the sender of the
letter will receive a confirmation if the letter is actually received. The "certificate of
mailing" is simply a receipt, acquired at the time the letter is mailed, that confirms the
fact of mailing. It provides no confirmation that the letter was received. Using a certificate
of mailing is more attractive to insurers because the certificate costs only about 50 cents,
considerably less than the cost of sending a certified or registered letter.
241. Feldt, 240 Kan. at 111, 726 P.2d at 1343-44.
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Although the court in Feldt said Richmeier was inapplicable,
the court's reasoning in Feldt is difficult to reconcile with Rich-
meier. It is true, as the court stated, that section 40-3118(b) did
not apply in Richmeier because Richmeier involved cancellation
for nonpayment of a premium, for which section 40-3118(b) states
no requirements. Yet, despite the absence of any statutory require-
ment that any particular kind of notice of cancellation be given,
the court in Richmeier interpreted the policy to require the giving
of actual notice. Presumably, the policy in Feldt, the notice
provisions of which were substantially similar to those in Rich-
meier,24 could also have been construed to require more notice
than the statute required, but the court in Feldt did not do this.
Be that as it may, it would have been incongruous to have
interpreted section 40-3118(b) as requiring the insurer to prove
actual receipt of a notice of cancellation for nonpayment of
premium, when the apparent purpose of the exception in the statute
concerning cancellation for nonpayment of premium is to make it
easier for insurers to cancel policies for that reason.
Currently, then, section 40-3118(b) does not require actual receipt
of notice of cancellation of an automobile insurance policy. In
addition, under the statute, no notice of any kind is required for
cancellation of an automobile insurance policy for nonpayment of
premium. Presumably, however, the automobile insurance contract
between insurer and insured could place a greater burden on the
insurer. Although Koehn also involved automobile insurance, that
case's requirement that notice actually be received might represent
the Kansas rule for cancellation cases not involving automobile
insurance.
F. Direct Actions Against Motor Carriers
Apart from a few exceptional situations, the victim of a tort
has no claim against the tortfeasor's insurer until the underlying
liability of the tortfeasor to the victim is established. The source
of this general rule is the "no-action clause" typically found in a
liability insurance policy, which ordinarily provides that no action
lies against the insurer until the insured's obligation has been
242. The policy in Richmeier said that the policy might be canceled during the policy
period "by mailing to the named insured . . . at least 10 days notice . . . if cancellation is
for nonpayment of premium . . . . Proof of mailing of any notice shall be sufficient proof
of notice." Richmeier v. Williams, 9 Kan. App. 2d 222, 223-24, 675 P.2d 372, 374 (1984).
In Feldt, the policy provided that cancellation could not occur unless "we [meaning the
insurer] . . . mail notice to the named insured by certified or registered mail or United
States post office certificate of mailing . Feldt, 240 Kan. at 110, 726 P.2d at 1342.
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determined by a final judgment or in a settlement agreement
approved by the insurer. Thus, if a third party were to sue the
insurer as the beneficiary of a contract between insurer and insured,
the third party would lose because the contract upon which the
third party is asserting rights specifies that the insurer owes nothing
to the insured-and concomitantly to the third party-until the
underlying liability of the insured to the third party is established
by judgment or settlement agreement. One of the exceptional
situations is when a statute specifically authorizes the victim's
direct action against the insurer, thereby superseding any no-action
clause in the contract between insurer and insured. 2 43
Section 66-1,128 of Kansas Statutes Annotated has been con-
strued as providing a party injured by a negligent insured motor
carrier with a direct action against the insurer. By no means is
this result clearly mandated by the language of the statute, but
this construction is set forth in a long line of cases dating back
to the supreme court's 1937 decision in Twichell v. Hetzel.244 In
Nirschl v. Webb,A5 a 1986 decision, the supreme court retreated
from this line of authority when it held that the trial court did
not err in excluding the defendant-insurer as a named defendant
at the jury trial in which the sole issues were the comparative fault
of the drivers of the two vehicles involved in the accident and the
damages suffered. The court noted that there was no issue regard-
ing the insurer's negligence (indeed, it is difficult to imagine a
situation in which the insurer's negligence would be at issue), and
it found no logical reason for injecting the subject of insurance
into the trial.246 The insurer did remain a party to the lawsuit for
the purpose of paying any resulting judgment if its insured were
found liable, but the insurer's involvement was not revealed to the
jury. The court said there may be circumstances in which the trial
court would be justified in advising the jury of the presence of an
243. See generally R. JERRY, supra note 1, § 84[b].
244. 145 Kan. 139, 64 P.2d 557 (1937). Other cases in this line of authority include
Jones v. Thunderbird Transp. Co., 178 F. Supp. 9 (D. Kan. 1959); Boyles v. Farmers
Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 706 (D. Kan. 1948); White v. Goodville Mut. Casualty
Co., 226 Kan. 191, 596 P.2d 1229 (1979); Sterling v. Hartenstein, 185 Kan. 50, 341 P.2d
90 (1959); Billups v. American Sur. Co., 170 Kan. 666, 228 P.2d 731 (1951); Fitzgerald v.
Thompson, 167 Kan. 87, 204 P.2d 756 (1949); Waugh v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 157
Kan. 690, 143 P.2d 788 (1943). The origin of this line of authority is in the notion that a
liability policy pays proceeds directly to the victim, whereas a "loss policy" pays proceeds
for which the insured may become liable to pay. This distinction is plainly one of form,
not substance, but its early recognition resulted in the creation of a limited form of direct
action in Kansas.
245. 239 Kan. 90, 716 P.2d 173 (1986).
246. Id. at 94, 716 P.2d at 177.
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insurer as a party to the case, and it suggested that when a separate
attorney for the insurer actively participates in the case, such
advice may be necessary. Under the particular circumstances of
Nirschl, however, it was not error for the trial court to order that
the insurer's presence in the litigation as a named party not be





Interpretation of "Improvements and Betterments" and Value
Reporting Clauses in Fire Insurance Policy: Ron Henry Ford,
Lincoln, Mercury, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 8 Kan.
App. 2d 766, 667 P.2d 907 (1983) ("improvements and better-
ments" clause in a fire insurance policy, which covers lessee's use
interest in fixtures, alterations, etc. added to the leased property,
only covers improvements added during the lease term; under value
reporting clause in particular policy, report of values filed after
loss but within grace period of policy is not effective).
Interpretation of Scope of Coverage of Property Policy: Mears
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 8 Kan. App. 2d 760, 667 P.2d 902
(1983) (property insurance policy for cattle, by its unambiguous
terms, covered calves born in herd after policy was issued).
Interpretation of Provision Relating to Permissible Fliers of
Aircraft; Exclusions and Causation: Western Food Products Co.
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 10 Kan. App. 2d 375, 699 P.2d
579 (1985) (provision relating to permissible fliers of aircraft found
unambiguous; held that insurer need not establish a causal link
between excluded activity and accident resulting in loss when
exclusion clearly states that no coverage exists under certain cir-
cumstances).
Interpretation; "Mysterious Disappearance"; All-Risk Insurance:
Empire Underground Storage, Inc. v. Protective Nat'l Ins. Co.,
685 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Kan. 1988) (under all-risk policy, insured
has burden to show that loss occurred during policy period; when
247. Id. at 95, 716 P.2d at 177.
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all-risk policy insuring propane in underground caverns covered
"mysterious disappearance" and no inventory was required at
inception of policy, insurer implied insured amount of propane
recorded in insured's books and accepted risk that loss could be
disclosed on taking of inventory; thus, when inventory during
policy period showed mysterious loss of approximately 50,000
barrels of propane, loss occurred within the policy period even
though the last prior physical inventory occurred about three years
before inception of policy).
Interpretation of "Resident of Household" Under Homeowner's
Policy: Friedman v. Alliance Ins. Co., 240 Kan. 229, 729 P.2d
1160 (1986) (personal property belonging to son of insured, who
was moving the property in a U-Haul between apartment at
University of Texas, where son had just graduated, and location
of new job in Alabama, was stolen during move; held that suffi-
cient competent evidence existed to support trial court's finding
that son was resident of his father's household at the time of
.loss).
Interpretation of "Resident Spouse": Lorence v. Farmers Alli-
ance Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 112, 673 P.2d 460 (1983),
review denied, 234 Kan. 1076 (1984) (when policy covered named
insured and resident spouse, but named insured and spouse were
divorced prior to fire loss, former spouse is not entitled to coverage
for personal belongings left in house belonging to named insured
but in which former spouse resided).
Interpretation; Scope of Exclusion in Banker's Blanket Bond:
Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 656
F. Supp. 200 (D. Kan. 1987) (bank used overnight mail service to
ship U.S. treasury receipts with face value exceeding $2.5 million;
receipts were lost; underwriter on banker's blanket bond issued to
bank claimed the exclusion for loss of property while with carrier
for hire, but excepting from exclusion nonnegotiable instruments
while in possession or custody of carrier for hire; underwriter
argued that treasury receipts were negotiable; held that policy is
not ambiguous, and loss is covered).
Interpretation; Inland Marine Policy; "Loss of Market" Con-
strued: Boyd Motors, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 670 F.
Supp. 310 (D. Kan. 1987) (insurer issued inland marine policy to
Volkswagen Credit, Inc. for benefit of car dealers; plaintiff-dealer's
inventory damaged by hail, for which it received proceeds for cost
of repair; plaintiff sought additional sum under inland marine
policy under theory that repaired inventory was worth less than
new inventory; held that policy exclusion for "loss of market"





Interpretation of "Insured" in Life Insurance Policy: Lightner
v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 242 Kan. 29, 744 P.2d 840 (1987)
(wife was owner and sole beneficiary of six life insurance policies
on her husband; husband and wife were killed simultaneously in
accident; district court ordered proceeds, under terms of policies,
to estate of husband, where larger estate tax was incurred; on
appeal, court notes that "insured" in the policies sometimes re-
ferred to the insured and sometimes to the owner, and thus the
term was ambiguous; held that because wife purchased the policies
on life of her husband to prevent proceeds from going to husband's
estate and that her estate is entitled to the proceeds of insurance
on husband's life).
Interpretation; Life Insurance Beneficiary Designation: Pierce v.
Pierce, 12 Kan. App. 2d 810, 758 P.2d 252 (1988), aff'd by a
split court, 244 Kan. 246, 767 P.2d 292 (1989) (when divorce
decree required husband to maintain life insurance with his two
minor children as beneficiaries, husband's attempt to change the
beneficiary when he remarried was of no force and effect; the
words "minor children" in separation agreement are words of
identification, and use of those words does not mean that children
are entitled to benefits only during their minority).
c. Liability Insurance
Exclusion in General Liability Policy for Contractor Concerning
Property Damage for Work Performed by Contractor: Owings v.
Gifford, 237 Kan. 89, 697 P.2d 865 (1985) (exclusion in a general
liability policy for "property damage to work performed by or on
behalf of the named insured [the contractor] arising out of the
work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts, or equip-
ment furnished in connection therewith" held to exclude damage
to the house being constructed by the builder and not to cover
damages arising from the builder's faulty construction; such dam-
ages might be covered by a performance bond or a guarantee of
contractual performance for repair or replacement of faulty work-
manship, but the liability policy does not serve as this bond or
guarantee).
Household Exclusion; Homeowner's Liability Policy: Patrons
Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Harmon, 240 Kan. 707, 732 P.2d 741 (1987)
(held that household exclusion in homeowner's liability policy was
not ambiguous, and son's wrongful death claim alleging death of
mother, both of whom were insureds, was excluded under language




"Completed Operations" Coverage; Contractor's Liability Pol-
icy: Nash v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 11 Kan. App. 2d
326, 720 P.2d 1129 (1986) (when policy is read as a whole and
not in fragmented manner, policy is unambiguous and does not
provide "completed operations" coverage for insured's carpentry
business).
Interpretation; Effect of Declaration Page: Thompson v. Harold
Thompson Trucking, 12 Kan. App. 2d 449, 748 P.2d 430 (1987)
(general rules of construction of insurance policy stated; declara-
tions page is not actual part of the contract, unless specifically
included by reference; held that insurer in workers' compensation
policy wishing to limit scope of coverage to classification of
operations listed in the declarations can do so only by express
exclusion).
Aviation Insurance; Air Traffic Operator Liability Endorsement:
Forum Ins. Co. v. Seitz Aviation, Inc., 241 Kan. 334, 737 P.2d
29 (1987) (in specific facts presented, an air taxi operator liability
endorsement to an aviation policy held to apply only to liability
arising from the negligent operation, maintenance, or use of the
aircraft in the interstate carriage of persons or property as a
common carrier for compensation or hire).
d. Automobiles
Interpretation of "Insured" in Automobile Dealer's Insurance
Policy: Western Motor Co. v. Koehn, 242 Kan. 402, 748 P.2d 851
(1988) (Koehn damaged dealer's automobile while test driving it;
dealer's insurer (Universal) who paid for loss, sought subrogation
against Koehn, who had liability insurance with State Farm; Uni-
versal denied coverage to Koehn; Koehn claimed he was covered
under Universal liability policy and therefore Universal could not
assert subrogation against Koehn, its own insured; district court
held that customer was not insured under Universal policy; court
of appeals reversed, 12 Kan. App. 2d 215, 738 P.2d 466 (1987),
and supreme court affirmed this reversal; therefore, Universal had
a subrogation right against Koehn).
Interpretation; Phrase "Domestic Employment"; Loading and
Unloading Provision: Canal Ins. Co. v. Earnshaw, 629 F. Supp.
114 (D. Kan. 1985) (phrase "domestic employment" in policy
exception from employment exclusion for injuries arising out of
and in the course of "domestic employment" referred to house-
hold-related nature of the work performed rather than location of
where work was performed; thus, coverage of employer was ex-
cluded; individual involved in loading or unloading insured vehicle
from which alleged injury arose did not qualify as insured under
896 [Vol. 37
SURVEY: INSURANCE LAW
policy exclusion providing that person was covered only if he were
lessee or borrower of the vehicle or employee of the named insured
or of such lessee or borrower).
Interpretation of "Occupying" in Exclusion Clause of Auto
Policy: Beasley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Kan. App.
2d 561, 682 P.2d 689 (1984) (employee of insured was injured
when employee's arm was caught in trash compactor lid of in-
sured's truck; held that under facts of case, employee was "in and
on" and therefore "occupying" the insured vehicle within the
meaning of the loading-unloading exclusion clause when the injury
occurred and therefore was entitled to PIP benefits).
Interpretation of Replacement Vehicle Coverage in Auto Insur-
ance Policy: Continental Ins. Co. v. Entrikin, 9 Kan. App. 2d
384, 680 P.2d 913 (1984) (whether a newly acquired vehicle is a
replacement for an insured vehicle is not determined by insured's
failure to convey title to replaced vehicle within the statutory
period, in absence of specific language to contrary in insurance
policy; whether vehicle is a "replacement" depends on a variety
of listed factors).
Interpretation of "a Person" in Uninsured Motorist Coverage;
Meaning of "Automobile" in Statute: Klamm v. Carter, 11 Kan.
App. 2d 574, 730 P.2d 1099 (1986) (an exclusion in uninsured
motorist coverage that denied coverage for "a person" injured
while occupying a motor vehicle owned by named insured but not
insured under policy was construed to apply to a named insured
injured while riding his uninsured motorcycle; under terms of the
policy, thirty-day grace period of coverage for newly acquired
vehicles does not include a newly purchased motorcycle; automobile
as used in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284 includes motorcycles).
Interpretation of "Regular Use" Exclusion of Automobile Pol-
icy: Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, 235 Kan. 331, 681
P.2d 15 (1984) (policy covers cars used by insured with permission
of owner, but not cars "furnished for the regular use" of insured;
"regular use" exclusion held not ambiguous; "regular use" exclu-
sion defined as continuous use, uninterrupted normal use for all
purposes, and without limitation; customary use as opposed to
occasional use; whether "regular use" exists is deemed a question
of fact; held that van driven by nursing student twice a week to
transport other students was not furnished for the regular use of
the student and thus not excluded from the coverage).
2. Property Insurance
Consequential Damages; Interest on Proceeds Wrongly Withheld
by Insurer: Hochman v. American Family Ins. Co., 9 Kan. App.
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2d 151, 673 P.2d 1200 (1984) (in action against insurer to recover
cost of repairs of insured combine, court held that interest incurred
by insured on sums borrowed for repairs is recoverable as conse-
quential damages when the borrowing was necessitated by the
insurer's failure to timely pay the claim).
Attorney Fees in Garnishment Action Against Insurer: Farmco,
Inc. v. Explosive Specialists, Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 507, 684 P.2d
436 (1984) (attorney fees are recoverable under KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-256 in a garnishment action by a judgment creditor against
the judgment debtor's insurance carrier, and this right to attorney
fees is not superseded by the garnishment statutes; KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-256 and 40-2004 allow for recovery by any "plaintiff,"
which includes owner of property on which work is done by
contractor who was required to procure insurance for benefit of
owner).
Visible Marks Requirement; Federal Crime Policy: Baugher v.
Secretary of Housing & Urban Dev., 623 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Kan.
1985) (federal crime insurance policy required that felonious ab-
straction of property be evidenced by visible marks on exterior of
premises at place of entry; prior to loss, storage unit was secured
by two combination locks and one key lock; when loss discovered,
combination locks were missing but key lock was in place; held
that missing locks constituted "visible marks" within the meaning
of the policy).
Business Interruption Insurance; Amount of Recovery: Midland
Broadcasters, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 636 F. Supp. 165
(D. Kan. 1986) (when radio station's broadcast tower was damaged
by windstorm, causing station to be off the air for two days and
at reduced power for two months thereafter, station could not
recover under policy for loss of advertising sales after station was
restored to full power, based upon evidence that station's ratings
suffered as a direct result of the business interruption even after
station was restored to full power).
3. Personal Insurance
McCarran-Ferguson Act; ERISA Preemption; Health Insurance:
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Bell, 798 F.2d 1331 (10th Cir. 1986)
(Kansas mandated provider law, which required insurer to pay for
services of specific providers, constituted "business of insurance"
within meaning of McCarran-Ferguson Act and was thus exempt
from ERISA preemption).
Life Insurance; Late Premium Payments; Waiver and Forfeiture:
Roberts v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 808 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.
1987) (insured paid premiums late every quarter beginning in 1977,
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relying upon a credit for the available loan value of the policy
plus a remittance after the grace period; insurer did not require
reinstatement application until 1979, when reinstatement was de-
nied; district court held that insurer's conduct justifiably led in-
sured to believe that late premium payments would be accepted
without fulfillment of the reinstatement requirement, even after
grace period; reversed and remanded, because late payment in
question was almost 100 days late, whereas prior payments were
no more than 15 days late; additional findings necessary on whether
insurer's course of conduct extended period for paying premiums
by nearly 100 days).
Disability Insurance; Occupational Versus General Disability
Coverage; Effect of Conduct Clause: Moots v. Bankers Life Co.,
10 Kan. App. 2d 640, 707 P.2d 1083 (1985) (general definitions
of occupational disability and general disability coverages dis-
cussed; construed "conduct clause," which purported to exclude
coverage if the insured engages in any occupation, work, or
employment for compensation during the disability, as duplicating
the insuring clause and not requiring a departure from customary
rules of construction of disability coverages).
4. Liability. Insurance
Duty to Defend; Constitutionality of Health Care Provider
Insurance Act: Harrison v. Long, 241 Kan. 174, 734 P.2d 1155,
appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 50 (1987) (physician's insurer and
Health Care Stabilization Fund settled malpractice claim against
physician over the objection of physician; physician claimed Health
Care Provider Insurance Act was unconstitutional because it took
away physician's right to defend himself; held that provisions of
Act denying physician the right to continue litigation does not
deprive physician of property right or due process right under
either the federal or state constitution).
Duty to Defend; Attorney Fees: Missouri Medical Ins. Co. v.
Wong, 234 Kan. 811, 676 P.2d 113 (1984) (when the Health Care
Stabilization Fund provides a defense to an insured in circum-
stances in which the primary insurer has failed to perform its duty,
the Fund is entitled to recover the amount paid to settle the claim
to the extent of the primary insurer's policy limits and also attorney
fees and expenses incurred in defending against the claim).
Excess versus Primary Insurer; Duty to Settle: Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Medical Protective Co., 768 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1985)
(primary insurer acted negligently and in bad faith in pursuing
settlement negotiations in medical malpractice action; excess insurer
is entitled to be subrogated to insured's right to assert a claim for




ICC-Licensed Interstate Motor Carriers; Liability Insurance Cov-
erage: American Gen. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch.,
660 F. Supp. 557 (D. Kan. 1987) (federal statutes and regulations
pertaining to interstate carrier's use of nonowned equipment did
not render carrier or its insurer exclusively liable for personal
injuries or property damage sustained in accident involving equip-
ment; insurer of truck lessor not entitled to contribution from
insurer of lessee-carrier when lessee was insured as permissive user
under lessor's policy).
No-Fault; Subrogation Right of Insurer When Tortfeasor Was
Not Operator of Automobile: Yunghans v. Carson, 9 Kan. App.
2d 45, 670 P.2d 928 (1983) (insured was injured when his truck
struck a steer; insured sued steer's owner on theories of negligence
and absolute liability; held that pursuant to literal application of
statute's language, insurer that has paid PIP benefits to its insured
does not have a right of subrogation under KAN. STAT. ANN. §
40-3113a when the insured obtains a duplicative recovery from a
tortfeasor other than an owner, operator, or occupant of a motor
vehicle or a person legally responsible for the tortious acts of such
person).
Disability PIP Benefits: Dewey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 739 F.2d
1494 (10th Cir. 1984) (district court did not err in awarding insured
maximum monthly disability benefit under KAIRA because, even
though insured was only partially disabled during last three of
nine months of disability, evidence supported finding that the
value of insured's lost services was at least the maximum).
Subrogation Under Section 40-3113a of Kansas Statutes Anno-
tated; Reduction of PIP Carrier's Recovery for Insured's Attorney
Fees: American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 9 Kan. App. 2d
482, 681 P.2d 683 (1984) (history of § 40-3113a and legal principles
thereunder summarized; PIP carrier's obligation to pay attorney
fees for recovery of duplicative PIP benefits does not depend on
actual pecuniary benefit to it from activities of insured's attorney;
this is extension from principle that PIP carrier must pay its share
of the fees even if it is also the tortfeasor's liability carrier, and
the payment of fees is merely an entry on its own books; noted
that when the PIP and the liability insurer are the same insurer,
the liability for the insured's attorney fees can be avoided if the
insurer makes advance payments to the injured insured under KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-275, according to the holding of Howard v.
Edwards, 9 Kan. App. 2d 763, 689 P.2d 911 (1984), summarized
below).
"Struck By" Requirement For Receiving PIP Benefits: Pestock
v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 188, 674 P.2d 1062
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(1984) (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3107(f) requires that one not an
occupant of a motor vehicle be "struck by" a motor vehicle to
receive PIP benefits; plaintiff's minor daughter was struck and
fatally injured by motorist in front of plaintiff's house; plaintiff,
who neither saw nor heard the accident, arrived at the scene a few
minutes later, and subsequently required psychiatric care, is not
entitled to PIP benefits under driver's insurance policy).
Subrogation; Section 40-3113a of Kansas Statutes Annotated:
O'Donnell v. Fletcher, 9 Kan. App. 2d 491, 681 P.2d 1074 (1984)
(ordinarily, when insured is not fully reimbursed for loss, insured
is proper party to bring suit against third-party wrongdoer for
entire loss, holding in trust any recovery duplicative of payments
made by insurer; section 40-3113a alters this general rule and
provides that if injured person fails to bring action against tort-
feasor within 18 months after date of accident, that failure operates
as assignment of injured person's tort claim to the insurer, who
can then sue to recover damages duplicative of PIP benefits paid;
under statute, insurer may enforce claim in its own name even
though injured party was only partly recompensed).
Scope of "Drive Other Car" Exclusion in Automobile Insurance
Policy: Ramsey v. Kansas Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 237 Kan. 86,
697 P.2d 863 (1985) (exclusionary provision of "drive other car"
clause in automobile insurance policy held to exclude coverage if
the other car is owned by a member of the insured's household
or is provided for regular use to the named insured).
No-Fault and Liability Insurance; Advance Payments When
Liability Insurer is Also PIP Carrier; Calculating Attorney Fees:
Howard v. Edwards, 9 Kan. App. 2d 763, 689 P.2d 911 (1984)
(when liability carrier is also injured party's PIP carrier, liability
carrier can still make advance damage payments under § 40-275;
when advance payments are made and these payments are deducted
from a subsequent settlement or judgment, the insurer has not
recovered PIP benefits and the plaintiff's attorney is not entitled
to a fee for such an alleged recovery).
Uninsured Motorist Coverage Issued to Corporation; Who En-
joys Coverage: Sears v. Wilson, 10 Kan. App. 2d 494, 704 P.2d
389 (1985) (when uninsured motorist policy is issued to a corpo-
ration, standard form language referring to insured's family mem-
bers and relatives is a nullity; absent clause expressly granting
coverage to family members of an employee of a corporate named
insured, family member is only covered by corporation's uninsured
motorist policy when occupying a vehicle covered by the policy).
Definition of "Monthly Earnings" in Section 40-3103(1) of
Kansas Statutes Annotated; Constitutionality of KAIRA: Burriss
v. Northern Assurance Co., 236 Kan. 326, 691 P.2d 10 (1984),
1989] 901
KANSAs LAW REVIEW
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985) (social security and retirement
benefits do not constitute "monthly earnings" as defined in § 40-
3103(1); the KAIRA's allowance of certain benefits to injured
employed persons and their survivors, but not to unemployed
persons and their survivors, does not render the KAIRA uncon-
stitutional under the due process or equal protection clauses of
the United States Constitution).
Definition of "Uninsured Automobile" in Insurance Policy:
Kansas Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Miller, 236 Kan. 811, 696 P.2d
961 (1985) (court rejected insured's argument that "uninsured
automobile" should be defined as any automobile on which the
tortfeasor has purchased less liability insurance than the insured
carries; court noted that legislature closed this gap in 1981 when
"underinsured motorist" provisions in KAN.. STAT. ANN. § 40-
284(b) were adopted; court was unwilling to write into the policy
underinsured coverage for 1978 accident).
Definition of Insured Under Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Gir-
rens v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 238 Kan. 670, 715 P.2d 389
(1986) (the definition of insureds under uninsured motorist cov-
erage cannot be more restrictive than the class covered by the
liability coverage for personal injury and property damage under
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3107; the term "dependent person" in
policy "relates to a monetary or otherwise generally accepted
familial dependence for care and sustenance").
Effect of Mentioning Insurance Coverage Before Jury When
Insurer is Party to Lawsuit Under Direct Action Statute: Klinzmann
v. Beale, 9 Kan. App. 2d 20, 670 P.2d 67 (1983) (when insurer is
party to lawsuit under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-1,128, a direct action
statute, merely mentioning insurance before the jury lacks the
inherent prejudice that would occur in a case in which the insurer
is not, and cannot legally be, a party; held that comments before
the jury by the plaintiffs' counsel, which might have been reversible
error in a nondirect action setting, were not grounds for reversal
when the insurer was a party).
No-Fault; Monetary Threshold for Tort Action: Smith v. Van-
guard Products Corp., 9 Kan. App. 2d 585, 682 P.2d 1313 (1984)
(the $500 medical expense threshold in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3117, which was recently increased to $2000, refers to the value
of "medical treatment"; replacement of eyeglasses damaged in a
collision is not "medical treatment" for the purpose of meeting
the monetary threshold when the insured suffers no injury to the
eyes requiring any different correction than was required before
the collision).
6. Miscellaneous
Statutory Requirements; Effect on Policy's Coverage: Missouri
Medical Ins. Co. v. Wong, 234 Kan. 811, 676 P.2d 113 (1984)
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(the policies of an out-of-state insurer that does business in Kansas
must be construed to contain the coverage required by Kansas
statutory law; held that occurrence policy sold in Kansas by
Missouri insurer is actually a "claims-made" policy as required by
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3402(a); the insurer's limit of liability is
not shielded by the minimum statutory requirement of $100,000
per occurrence and $300,000 aggregate, however, and the insurer
is held liable to provide coverage of $1,000,000, as set forth in
the limits of the coverage).
Group Insurance; Conflict of Laws: Simms v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 640, 685 P.2d 321 (1984) (KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2,105 does not apply to policy issued prior to statute's
enactment or to insurance contract made outside Kansas; group
insurance policy is ".made" when master policy is delivered, not
when certificates of coverage to individual employees are issued).
Retrospective Premium Policy; Burden to Show Reasonableness
of Settlements: Transit Casualty Co. v. Topeka Transp. Co., 8
Kan. App. 2d 597, 663 P.2d 308 (1983) (when insurer seeks
retrospective premiums based on amounts it has paid in settling
claims against its insured, burden is on insurer to establish that
the settlements were made in good faith and were reasonable in
amount).
Interpleader; When Does Insurer "Make Payment": Bryan v.
Davis, 11 Kan. App. 2d 691, 732 P.2d 805 (1987) (insurer in
interpleader action is discharged from liability under policy upon
paying to the clerk of the district court the full amount of the
policy; payment is "made" when insurer makes such payment to
the court).
Misrepresentation: Missouri Medical Ins. Co. v. Wong, 234 Kan.
811, 676 P.2d 113 (1984) (argument that insurer could cancel policy
because of insured's misrepresentation as to place of residence was
invalid when insurer's agents knew at time of issuance of policy
exactly where the insured was practicing medicine).
Bad Faith; Extracontractual Liability of Insurer to Insured:
United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Reed, 649 F. Supp. 837 (D.
Kan. 1986) (Reed's claims for health expenses were denied by
health insurer on ground that Reed's status as employee had
terminated; Reed argued he was told by insurer's agent that he
could convert the group coverage to individual coverage; held that
Reed has no cause of action for bad faith, which is not recognized
as tort in Kansas; held that Reed does have cause of actions for
misrepresentation, reformation, and breach of contract, but Reed
has no claim for extracontractual damages because he alleged no
independent tort causing "additional injury").
Timeliness of Notice of Loss: Home Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 11
Kan. App. 2d 280, 719 P.2d 756 (1986) (held that district court
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erred in granting summary judgment for an insurer on a bond
when the insured bank delayed giving notice for 18 months after
the discovery of a loss; surety will not be relieved of liability on
its bond unless it can show it was prejudiced by the delay in giving
notice of loss).
Employer Estopped to Deny Existence of Health Insurance
Coverage: Cory v. Binkley Co., 235 Kan. 906, 684 P.2d 1019
(1984) (when employee's job status changed to that of independent
contractor, and employee did not understand when status changed
so that no insurance would be provided by employer, sufficient
evidence existed to support the verdict that the employer, which
had undertaken to procure health insurance for its employees,
should be equitably estopped to deny the existence of coverage).
B. Statutory Changes
1. Property Insurance
Title Insurance Rate Regulation: Act approved May 17, 1988,
ch. 156, 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 957, 966 (to be codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-1111(d)) (effective July 1, 1989, subjects title
insurance rates to the requirements of casualty rate regulation).
2. Personal Insurance
Group Insurance; Replacement Policies: Act approved Apr. 14,
1988, ch. 160, 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 973, 973-74 (to be codified
at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2209(A)) (prohibits group accident and
sickness insurers from applying individual underwriting on replace-
ment group policies issued to one employer; but allows replacing
insurers to impose a waiting period not to exceed one year "upon
coverage for conditions of health which existed prior to the date
of enrollment of such employee, dependent or family member,
hospitalization in progress on the date of enrollment need not be
covered, and the plan may impose participation requirements,
define full-time employees and otherwise design the coverage for
the group as a whole to be negotiated between the employer and
insurer").
Life Insurance; Interest on Proceeds: Act approved Apr. 17,
1987, ch. 164, 1987 Kan. Sess. Laws 800 (amends KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-447 to provide that an insurer that fails to pay proceeds
of life insurance within ten days after the date of receipt of due
proof of death shall pay interest on sums unpaid after the ten-day
period at an annual rate of not less than the current rate of interest
on death proceeds left on deposit with the insurer plus one percent
computed from the date of the receipt).
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Health Insurance; Coverage for Drug and Alcohol Abuse and
Mental Illness: Act approved Apr. 24, 1986, ch. 174, 1986 Kan.
Sess. Laws 831 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,105 (1986))
(requires group and individual health insurance policies to include
minimum coverage for drug and alcohol abuse and mental illness).
Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association: Act approved
Apr. 25, 1986, ch. 180, 1986 Kan. Sess. Laws 850 (major revision
of Kansas life and health insurance guaranty association act; limits
the protection of the act to residents only; places limits on coverage
available; reinstates coverage for annuities).
3. Casualty Insurance
Casualty Insurance; Rate Regulation: Act approved May 17,
1988, ch. 155, 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 940 (effective January 1,
1989, modifies fire, marine, inland marine, and casualty rate
regulation procedures, including requiring the consideration of
investment income in making insurance rates, placing the burden
of proof on the company or rating organization to show that the
proposed rates meet the statutory standards, requiring rate filers
to provide all supporting information requested by the Insurance
Commissioner at the filer's expense, and giving the Insurance
Commissioner the authority to order prospective adjustments in
premiums regarding a disapproved rate; also requires an insurer
withdrawing from the state either totally or partially to give the
Commissioner 60 days notice of intent).
Cancellation by Insurer of Property and Casualty Insurance;
Insurer's Permissible Grounds: Act approved Apr. 18, 1986, ch.
168, 1986 Kan. Sess. Laws 820 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §
40-2,120 (1986)) (no policy of property or casualty insurance, other
than accident and sickness insurance, used primarily for business
or professional needs that has been in effect for 90 days or more
may be canceled except for one of six enumerated reasons; insurer
must give at least 60 days advance notice of intent not to renew;
requires insurer to give insured reasons for cancellation or non-
renewal of existing policy).
4. Auto Insurance
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage; Offering Require-
ments Under Excess Policies: Act approved Apr. 19, 1988, ch.
152, 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 907 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §
40-284 (Supp. 1988)) (provides that uninsured or underinsured
motorist coverage need not be offered or provided under umbrella
excess policies or other policies that are not primary).
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5. Miscellaneous
Discrimination in Rates; Blindness: Act approved Apr. 16, 1987,
ch. 171, 1987 Kan. Sess. Laws 831 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-2404 (Supp. 1988)) (prohibits unfair discrimination in the
underwriting or rating of insurance policies based on the insured's
blindness).
